NXP-Semicon-NT4H2421TTDUD-02Z
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NT4H2421Tx
NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag
Tamper feature
Rev. 3.0 — 31 January 2019
Product data sheet
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COMPANY PUBLIC
1 General
description
1.1 Introduction
NTAG 424 DNA TT (NT4H2421Tx) sets a new standard in secure NFC and IoT
applications, introducing a new NTAG DNA chip generation with state-of-the-art features
for security, status detection and privacy protection. It comes with AES-128 cryptographic
operation and a new Secure Unique NFC Message (SUN) feature to generate tap-unique
data authentication upon each read-out by an NFC enabled mobile device. This enables
most advanced product protection in terms of product authenticity and integrity, as well a
secure exclusive user experiences based on product status served in real time.
NTAG 424 DNA TT is fully compliant with the NFC Forum Type 4 Tag specification
(Certification ID: 58569), with the contactless proximity protocol according to ISO/
IEC14443-4 and the ISO/IEC 7816-4 based file system and command frames, to ensure
maximum interoperability within the NFC infrastructure. Its NFC performance supports
superior user interaction and an operating distance of up to 10 cm.
Using AES-128 cryptography, the tag generates a unique NFC authentication message
(SUN) each time it is being tapped. An NFC mobile device reads this tap-unique URL
with the SUN authentication message, sends it to the host where tag and message
authentication take place, and returns the verification result. The SUN authentication
mechanism is working on Android without a dedicated application and from iOS11
onwards using an application. This way, NTAG 424 DNA TT offers tag authentication,
as well as data assurances on authenticity, integrity and even confidentiality, while also
In addition, NTAG 424 DNA TT comes with smart status awareness, detecting the status
of a tamper loop. Users can instantly detect the once-opened status, by just reading the
tag with an NFC enabled device. The chip irrevocably stores this event, and mirrors it into
the NDEF message during startup.
The chip has a file-based memory structure of totally 416 bytes compliant to NFC Forum
Type 4 Tag and ISO/IEC 7816-4 with a Capability Container (CC) file to specify the
NFC Forum tag operation, an NDEF file as well as an extra data file to protect sensitive
content. Configurable access rights per file support different use cases of brand product
manufacturers and service providers to meet security and operational requirements.
With 5 customer defined AES keys, NTAG 424 DNA TT enables advanced cryptographic
functionality for CMAC, optionally combined with encrypted data, for SUN, mutual
authentication (secure host or reader authentication) and for secure access to the NDEF
file and the extra data file.
NTAG 424 DNA TT contains configurable features like optionally encrypting part of the
NDEF file, and the fully encrypted communication mode to address privacy sensitive
applications. The optional Random ID together with the encrypted chip UID/data that
NXP Semiconductors
NT4H2421Tx
NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
can be mirrored in the NDEF file, enables compliance with latest user data protection
regulations. Also the tamper status can be encrypted to add extra security.
Besides the standard AES-128 implementation, NTAG 424 DNA TT also offers an
alternative AES-based protocol for authentication and secure messaging using a
Leakage Resilient Primitive, or LRP, a wrapper around the AES cryptography to enhance
side-channel attack resistance.
Thanks to its high input capacitance of 50 pF, NTAG 424 DNA TT is well suited for
smart product applications requiring smaller footprint antennas, without compromise on
performance. Smaller NFC tags can more easily be embedded in product labels, caps
and closures, and other form factors.
2 Features
and benefits
2.1 RF
Interface & Communication Protocol
•
Support of ISO/IEC 7816-4 communication frames for highest interoperability with
mobile and wearables
•
Low power consumption (Hmin) enabling operating distances of up to 10 cm
•
Support of fast data rates: 106 kbit/s, 212 kbit/s, 424 kbit/s, and 848 kbit/s
•
Support of double size (7-byte) Unique Identifiers (UID) and optionally Random ID
•
Communication frame size to support up to 128 bytes
•
Support of ISO 7816-4 wrapped commands
2.2 Memory
Organization
•
416 bytes user memory
•
Data retention of 50 years and write endurance of minimum 200.000 cycles
•
File system compliant to ISO/IEC 7816-4 with one predefined Directory File (DF) and a
set of Elementary Files (EF)
–
Three standard data files, one with 32 byte for the capability file, one with 256 bytes
for NDEF storage and one with 128 bytes for protected data
•
File system compliant with ISO 7816
2.3 Security
and Privacy
•
Common Criteria certification: EAL4 for both Hardware and Software
•
Secure Unique NFC (SUN) message featuring integrity protection, authenticity and
confidentiality
•
The SUN feature is enabled by the Secure Dynamic Messaging (SDM) which is
mirrored as text (ASCII encoded) into the NDEF message
•
Incremental NFC Counter, which counts each tap
•
Secure messaging compliant to standard AES according to NIST Special Publication
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NT4H2421Tx
NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
–
Optional enhanced side channel attack protection using LRP wrapped AES operation
•
Five customer defined AES 128-bit keys including key versions
•
Optional Random ID for enhanced privacy
•
3-pass mutual authentication
•
Flexible access control configurable per file (EF)
–
Individual key configuration for Read (R) / Write (W) / ReadWrite (RW) / Configuration
•
Configurable secure messaging communication mode
–
Plain communication
–
CMAC protected for message integrity protection
–
Full Enciphered plus CMAC for full encryption of complete data transferred through
contactless interface
•
ECC-based NXP originality signature
•
AES-based originality keys leveraging the LRP wrapped AES authentication
2.4 Specific
Features
•
Tamper detection and secure mirroring into the NDEF message
•
Frame-level oriented automatic anti-tearing mechanism
•
High input capacitance (50 pF) for small form factor design
3 Applications
NTAG 424 DNA TT offers multi-layered security to enable a broad range of trusted
applications that protect products, services and user experiences.
•
Advanced anti-counterfeiting
Verify authenticity of physical goods and identify sales outside authorized markets
•
Tamper detection and proof
Detect unauthorized product opening to secure product integrity
•
Secured exclusive user experiences based on product status
Enabled advanced user interactions, pre- and post-sale. Also reward customers with
truly exclusive and personalized content, offers and privileges
•
Secured sensitive data applications
Protect sensitive product and user data, or trigger an action upon a verified incidence,
e.g., payment
•
Secure authentication and configuration of closed loop devices
Authenticate consumables and parts, enable an integrity check, and automatically
transfer device settings
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
4 Ordering
information
Table 1.ꢀOrdering information
Type number
Package Description
Version
NT4H2421TTDUD/02 FFC
–
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
NT4H2421TTDUF/02
FFC
–
–
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
NT4H2421TSDUD/02 FFC
NT4H2421TSDUF/02 FFC
NT4H2421TCDUD/02 FFC
NT4H2421TCDUF/02 FFC
Service version with preprogrammed NDEF message and keys
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
Service version with preprogrammed NDEF message and keys
–
–
–
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
Customer configurable version
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
Customer configurable version
256 Byte NDEF Message, 128 Byte User Memory, C
i
= 50 pF
[1] Delivered
on film frame carrier with electronic fail die marking according to SECSII format.
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
5 Quick
reference data
Table 2.ꢀQuick reference data
Symbol
Parameter
Conditions
Min
Typ
Max
Unit
C
i
input
45.0
50
55.0
pF
capacitance
f
i
input frequency
–
13.56
–
MHz
EEPROM characteristics
t
ret
retention time
T
amb
= 22 °C
T
amb
= 22 °C
50
–
–
–
–
year
N
endu
(W)
write
200.000
cycle
t
cy
(W)
write cycle time
T
amb
= 22 °C
–
1
–
ms
[1] T
amb
= 22 °C; f
i
= 13.56 MHz; 2 V RMS
[2] Write
endurance of a single EEPROM cell
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
6 Block
diagram
ANALOG
DIGITAL
CLOCK
SUPP
L
Y
RECTIFIER
CO-PROCESSORS
AES-128
LA
CLK RECOVERY
RESET
CONFIG
PLL
LIMITER
CRC
RNG
CLOCK
GENER
A
TOR
INTERRUPT
CONTROLLER
POWER
REGULATOR
COMMUNICATION
DEMODULATOR
LB
BAND-GAP
SFR bus
MODULATOR
CURRENT
BANK
COMMUNICATION
CPU/MMU
RESONANCE
CAPACITOR
ISO/IEC14443A
CIU
CPU
MMU
SENSORS
ANALOG
MULTIPLEXER
DP
POR
TRNG
VOLTAGE
SENSORS
MEMORY
TAG TAMPER
DETECTOR
SECURITY
SENSORS
ROM
EEPROM
RAM
GND
ESD
aaa-032480
Figure 1.ꢀNTAG 424 DNA TT IC blocks
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
7 Pinning
information
7.1 Pinning
LA
DP
LB
GND
aaa-032477
Figure 2.ꢀPin configuration
Table 3.ꢀPin allocation table
Pin
LA
Symbol
LA
antenna coil connection LA
LB
LB
antenna coil connection LB
Detection Pin
DP
GND
DP
GND
Ground
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
8 Functional
description
8.1 Interface
initialization and protocol
8.1.1 ISO/IEC
14443 parameter values
This section describes the values for ISO/IEC 14443 activation and selection. Usage of
requires a power cycle to make those changes effective.
ATQA
ATQA value is 0344h, which denotes double size (7-byte) UID. However, NT4H2421Tx
offers configuration of Random ID which is single size (4-byte). If the Random ID feature
is enabled, then the ATQA is changed to 0304h. According to ISO/IEC 14443-3, the
ATQA bytes are transmitted as LSB first.
SAK
For double size UID, the value of SAK1 in cascade level 1 is 04h, indicating that the UID
is not complete. SAK2 in cascade level 2 is 20h, indicating UID complete and supporting
ISO/IEC 14443-4. For single size UID which is used in the Random ID case, the value of
SAK is 20h, indicating UID complete and supporting ISO/IEC 14443-4.
UID
The ISO/IEC 14443-3 compliant UID is programmed and locked during production. The
first byte of the double size UID is fixed to 04h, indicating NXP as manufacturer.
ATS
The value of the ATS of NT4H2421Tx is as follows:
Table 4.ꢀATS value
ATS
Value
Comment
Parameter
TL
06h
77h
77h
Length of ATS
T0
TA(1), TB(1), TC(1) present in ATS and frame size is 128 bytes
TA(1)
Different communication speed can be set in each direction
supports communication speeds 212, 424, 848 kbps in both directions
TB(1)
TC(1)
T1
71h
02h
80h
Max frame waiting time is 38.66 ms, start frame guard time is 604 µs
CID supported
Historical byte
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
8.1.2 Setting
of higher communication speed
After receiving an ATS, a PPS request can be sent to the NT4H2421Tx to set up a higher
8.1.3 Half-duplex
block transmission protocol
NT4H2421Tx uses half-duplex block transmission protocol as specified in ISO/IEC
14443-4. It is fully compliant to block format, frame waiting time, frame waiting time
8.2 User
memory
The file system in the user memory is according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 and shown in
Figure 3
. In the DF (application), there are 3 EFs (files) and 5 keys.
PICC/MF Level
ISO MF Name = D2760000850100h
ISO File ID = 3F00h
NXP
Originality
Keys
Application/DF Level
ISO DF Name = D2760000850101h
ISO File ID = E110h
5 Application
Keys
File No. 01h
Standard Data File
CC File
File No. 02h
Standard Data File
NDEF File
File No. 03h
Standard Data File
Proprietary File
32 bytes
256 bytes
128 bytes
Def. Comm Mode: Plain
Def. Comm Mode: Plain
Def. Comm Mode: Full
aaa-032541
Figure 3.ꢀNTAG 424 DNA TT application
8.2.1 Application
and file selection
The MF (PICC Level), the DF (application) and the EFs (files) can be selected
The PICC level refers to the card itself and has the ISO DF Name D2760000850100h
and the File ID 3F00h. The only functionality available on PICC level is an LRP mode
8.2.2 Application
Name and ID
NT4H2421Tx is pre-configured with one application. The DF name and File ID are as
follows:
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NT4H2421Tx
NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
•
DF Name: D2760000850101h
•
File Identifier: E110h
8.2.3 Files
NT4H2421Tx stores user data into EF (files) of specific types. All files are statically
change the access rights configuration.
File access rights can be restricted with the keys of the application.
Table 5.ꢀFile management
EF (File) Type
File type
File no.
File ID
File size
coding
Example uses
StandardData file
00h
01h
02h
E103h
E104h
32 bytes
CC file
256 bytes
NDEF message, SDM and
mirroring supported
03h
E105h
128 bytes
Proprietary file, storage of raw
data
8.2.3.1 StandardData
file
A StandardData file stores the data as raw data bytes. Data is accessed by chunk of byte
at a certain offset in the StandardData file and with a certain byte length.
A StandardData file is not covered by the transaction mechanism and therefore does
not implement a transaction-based backup mechanism. Thus data are available to read
as soon as they are written in the file. The writing operations of single frames up to 128
NT4H2421Tx is configured to hold the NDEF message in StandardData file No 02h, see
Section 8.2.3
. Enabling SDM is only possible for this file. At delivery, SDM is disabled.
8.2.3.2 Capability
Container File
The Capability Container (CC) file is a StandardData file with respect to access rights
delivery it will hold following content:
•
CCLEN = 0017h, i.e. 23 bytes
•
T4T_VNo = 20h, i.e. Mapping Version 2.0
•
MLe = 0100h, i.e. 256 bytes
•
MLc = 00FFh, i.e. 255 bytes
•
NDEF-File_Ctrl_TLV
–
T = 04h, indicates the NDEF-File_Ctrl_TLV
–
L = 06h, i.e. 6 bytes
–
NDEF-File File Identifier = E104h
–
NDEF-File File Size = 0100h, i.e. 256 bytes
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
–
NDEF-File READ Access Condition = 00h, i.e. READ access granted without any
security
–
NDEF-File WRITE Access Condition = 00h, i.e. WRITE access granted without any
security
•
Proprietary-File_Ctrl_TLV
–
T = 05h, indicates the Proprietary-File_Ctrl_TLV
–
L = 06h, i.e. 6 bytes
–
Proprietary-File File Identifier = E105h
–
Proprietary-File File Size = 0080h, i.e. 128 bytes
–
Proprietary-File READ Access Condition = 82h, i.e. Limited READ access, granted
based on proprietary methods, after authentication with key 2h.
–
Proprietary-File WRITE Access Condition = 83h, i.e. Limited READWRITE access,
granted based on proprietary methods, after authentication with key 3h.
8.2.3.3 File
access rights management
File data is accessed with 3 different access rights Read, Write and ReadWrite.
In addition, an access right called Change is specified per file permitting
ChangeFileSettings
to change the file access rights.
An access right is granted if at least one condition associated to it is satisfied. Such
conditions are called access conditions. Access conditions are associated with an access
right and evaluated to decide whether the access right is granted or not. There are three
kinds of access conditions:
condition is satisfied if the current valid authentication has been performed with the
number.
accessed without an active authentication.
The access conditions are specified on 4 bits as defined in the following table.
Table 6.ꢀ Access condition
Condition value
Description
0h..4h
Eh
free access
Fh
no access or RFU
The set of access conditions is coded on 2 bytes as shown in the following table. RFU
access conditions are expected to be set to Fh (for future extensibility).
Table 7.ꢀ Set of Access condition
Bit index
15..12
11..8
Description
Read
Value
Write
7..4
ReadWrite
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
Bit index
3..0
Description
Value
Change
The default access conditions for the files in NT4H2421Tx is shown below in .
Table 8.ꢀDefault file access rights
File No.
01h
File Type
Read
Eh
Write
0h
ReadWrite Change
StandardData File
StandardData File
StandardData File
0h
0h
0h
0h
02h
Eh
03h
2h
3h
3h
[1] Write
and ReadWrite access rights for the NDEF File (File No. 02h) should be changed after personalization in order to
prevent unauthorized changes in the NDEF File.
Table 9.ꢀ Command list associated with access rights
Access Right
Command
Read
Write
ReadWrite
Change
–
SDMMetaRead
SDMFileRead
SDMCtrRet
an access right granting access to it is satisfied. If authenticated and the only access
conditions satisfied are the free access Eh ones, then the CommMode.Plain is to be
applied.
If not authenticated, Secure Dynamic Messaging will be applied if access is granted
via SDMFileRead, even if there is free access via one of the other access rights.
SDMFileRead is not affecting the regular secure messaging, i.e. if authenticated.
8.2.3.4 SDM
related access rights
A StandardData file can be associated with the following Secure Dynamic Messaging
access rights: SDMMetaRead, SDMFileRead and SDMCtrRet. SDMCtrRet is
GetFileCounters
command. The others have a different interpretation.
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
The SDMMetaRead access does not define access to certain commands, but it defines
the mirroring of PICCData, i.e. whether the PICCData will be mirrored in plain, encrypted
Note that it is still possible to enable plain PICCData mirroring of the UID even if Random
ID is enabled. For privacy protection, it is strongly recommended to use only encrypted
PICCData mirroring for the UID if Random ID is enabled.
Table 10.ꢀSDMMetaRead values
Condition value
Description
0h..4h
PICCData before mirroring
Eh
Fh
Plain PICCData mirroring
No PICCData mirroring
Table 11.ꢀSDMFileRead values
Condition value
Description
0h..4h
be applied for the Secure Dynamic Messaging
Eh
Fh
RFU
No Secure Dynamic Messaging for Reading
Note that SDMFileRead is not influenced by Read or ReadWrite access rights on the
NDEF file. If SDMFileRead is granted, the Secure Dynamic Messaging will always be
applied in not authenticated state. If SDMFileRead access right is set to Fh, it is still
possible to freely read the file if Read or ReadWrite access right are set to Eh. In this
configured for that.
8.2.3.5 Communication
modes
in the table, the different communication modes can be represented by two bits. This
representation is used at several places in the document.
Table 12.ꢀ Supported communication modes
Communication
mode
Bit Representation
Explanation
CommMode.Plain
X0b
No protection: message is transmitted in plain
text
CommMode.MAC
CommMode.Full
01b
11b
MAC protection for integrity and authenticity
Full protection for integrity, authenticity
and confidentiality, also referred to as “Full
Protection” mode
The communication mode defines the level of security for the communication between
PCD and PICC after mutual authentication. At application level, the communication
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
communication mode is applied if there is an active authentication regardless of whether
this authentication is required by the command or not.
At file level, the communication mode is defined by the file. The specified communication
mode is applied if there is an active authentication. Note, if the only valid access
condition for a certain access right is free access (Eh) under an active authentication,
The commands for authentication have their own secure messaging rules, as indicated
Full Protection mode.
If there is no active authentication, the command and response are sent in plain (or the
command is rejected in the case an authentication is required).
The default communication mode per file is shown in below.
Table 13.ꢀDefault communication modes per file
EF (File) Type
File no.
01h
Default communication mode
CommMode.Plain
StandardData file
02h
CommMode.Plain
03h
CommMode.Full
8.2.4 Keys
respectively. They are used to manage the security of the application.
Table 14.ꢀKeys at application level
Key Identifier
Key number
Change Key
Can be used for
Authentication
Addressable keys:
00h
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
00h..04h
00h..04h
00h..04h
00h..04h
8.2.4.1 AppMasterKey
8.2.4.2 AppKey
The application of the NT4H2421Tx includes 5 AES 128-bit keys with key numbers 0, 1,
2, 3, 4. Furthermore, key number “E” (means free) and key number “F” (means never)
can be assigned for access rights management.
The transport value of these 5 keys is 16 bytes of 00h, and can be changed by
authentication with key number 0 in transport configuration.
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Remark:
It is highly recommended to change all 5 keys at personalization, even if not all
keys are used in the application.
8.2.4.3 SDMMetaReadKey
SDMMetaReadKey
is used to encrypt PICCData before mirroring.
8.2.4.4 SDMFileReadKey
SDMFileReadKey
is used for Secure Dynamic Messaging.
8.2.4.5 TTStatusKey
SetConfiguration
Option 07h, when enabling the Tag Tamper Protection feature. Once
8.2.4.6 OriginalityKey
The authentication procedure for AES keys can be used to authenticate to one of the
Table 15.ꢀKeys at PICC level
Key Identifier
Key number
Can be used for
Authentication
Addressable keys:
OriginalityKey1
OriginalityKey2
OriginalityKey3
OriginalityKey4
01h
02h
03h
04h
yes
yes
yes
yes
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8.2.4.7 Key
version
A 1-byte key version (00h to FFh) is assigned to each key. This key version can be used
to distinguish the keys of a specific application if the same application uses different keys
or key versions.
GetVersion
command.
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8.3 Native
Command Format
NT4H2421Tx always communicates in ISO/IEC 7816-4 wrapped mode as described
commands which consist of the following parts.
A command as sent by the PCD consists of the concatenation of:
•
the command code (Cmd)
•
zero, one or more header fields (CmdHeader)
•
zero, one or more data fields (CmdData)
The response as sent by the PICC consists of the concatenation of:
•
the return code (RC)
•
zero, one or more data fields (RespData)
•
wrapping of the native command format into a proprietary ISO/IEC 7816-4 APDU
Remark:
Communication via native ISO/IEC7816-4 commands without wrapping is not
supported.
On the native command interface, plain command parameters consisting of multiple
bytes are represented least significant byte (LSB) first, similar as for ISO/IEC 14443
(including the random numbers exchanged during authentication, the TI and the
computed MACs), this does not hold. For these, the representation on the interface maps
one-to-one to the most significant byte (MSB) first notation used in this specification.
Note that within this document, the ’Xh’ prefix indicates hexadecimal integer notation, i.e.
not reflecting the byte order representation on the command interface at all.
8.4 ISO/IEC7816-4
Communication frame
commands.
Note that for all parameters of standard ISO/IEC 7816-4 commands, the representation
on the interface is most significant byte (MSB) first notation. As data like the 2-byte ISO/
IEC 7816-4 file identifiers, are in different order for the wrapped native commands, this
needs to be taken into account.
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PCD
PICC
Native
Cmd
CmdHeader
CmdData
RC
RespData
ISO7816 Data Field
CLA INS
P1
P2
Lc
Le
CmdHeader
CmdData
0x90 Cmd 0x00 0x00
0x00
status
RespData
SW1 SW2
ISO7816 Wrapped
aaa-032563
Figure 4.ꢀISO/IEC 7816-4 command response pair
Table 16.ꢀISO/IEC 7816-4 command fields
Field
Description
Length
Command header
Class byte (CLA)
Instruction (INS)
1
1
2
1
Parameters (P1,P2)
Lc field
Length of command data field (Lc), absent if no data field is
present
Command data
field
Absent if no data is sent in the command
Lc
1
Le field
Expected response length. If Le is 00h, then all available
data is sent back for ISO/IEC 7816-4 standard commands.
For wrapped commands, Le must always be set to 00h.
Note that the maximum number of bytes in the command data field, indicated by Lc,
cannot exceed 255 bytes since only short length (1 byte) is supported in NT4H2421Tx,
The maximum number of bytes in the response data field, indicated by Le, cannot
This includes overhead for secure messaging.
Table 17.ꢀISO/IEC 7816-4 response fields
Field
Description
Length
Response data
field
Response data if any, absent if no response data
up to Le
Response trailer
status byte (SW1SW2)
2
The field length and presence might vary for different commands, refer to the specific
8.5 Command
Chaining
cases:
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•
the PICC supports ISO/IEC 14443-4 chaining to allow larger command or response
frames than the supported buffer size for variants of the following commands:
i.e. every command where larger frame size can occur.
•
the PICC will automatically split a response in several frames to fit with the FSD frame
size supported by the PCD and communicated in the RATS.
reassembled INF field containing the command header (i.e. ISO/IEC 7816-4 header
bytes and/or (Cmd || CmdHeader)) fits within the PICC’s buffer (FSC) communicated in
the ATS. If not, the PICC may respond with LENGTH_ERROR.
The ISO/IEC 14443-4 chaining does not influence the secure messaging. This means
that the secure messaging mechanisms are applied as if the command or response
would have been sent in a single large frame. With regards to command execution,
commands are handled as if they were received in one large frame, except for write
command is received.
Note that this is important for StandardData files, where the file may end up in an
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8.6 Backup
management
NT4H2421Tx supports hardware based anti-tearing on single frame write operations.
This means that blocks up to 128 bytes are either completely written of not changed at
all.
8.7 Product
originality
NT4H2421Tx supports two types of originality check: one based on an LRP
authentication with AES originality keys and another one with a static signature
verification with an ECC public key. For detail of the ECC originality check, refer to
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9 Secure
Messaging
Prior to data transmission a mutual three-pass authentication can be done between PICC
and PCD which results in the generation of session keys used in the secure messaging.
There are three secure messaging types available in the NT4H2421Tx including Secure
Dynamic Messaging. One is using AES-128 and is referred to as AES mode in this data
sheet. The other one is using AES-128 with a Leakage Resilient Primitive (LRP) wrapper,
also referred to as LRP mode. The LRP mode can be permanently enabled using the
SetConfiguration
command. After this switch, it is not possible to revert back to AES
mode.
Compared to AES mode, the LRP mode has the advantage that it provides strong
resistance against side-channel and fault attacks. It serves as a replacement for
AES as it only uses standard cryptographic constructions based on AES without any
proprietary cryptography. Thus, LRP can be seen as an alternative for AES which is
itself based on AES, and is provably as secure as AES, but comes with better properties
implementation.
To improve the resistance against side-channel attacks and especially card only
attacks for the AES mode, NT4H2421Tx provides a limit for unsuccessful authentication
attempts. Every unsuccessful authentication is counted in the TotFailCtr. The parameters
“Failed authentication counter configuration”.
Each unsuccessful authentication is counted internally in the total failed authentication
cannot be used for authentication anymore.
In addition, after reaching a limit of
consecutive
unsuccessful authentication
attempts, the NT4H2421Tx starts to slow down the authentication processing in
order to hamper attacks. This is done by rejecting any authentication command
with a AUTHENTICATION_DELAY response. The response time of a single
is about 65% of the maximum response time specified by FWT. The error response is
sent until the total authentication delay time is reached which is equal to the sum of the
frame delay times. The total authentication delay time increases with each unsuccessful
authentication attempt up to a maximum value, only a successful authentication restores
the full operational speed.
Changing a blocked AES key by authenticating with the AppMasterKey and using the
ChangeKey
command makes the referenced key accessible again. If the AppMasterKey
itself is blocked, no recovery is possible.
Each successful AES authentication decrements the TotFailCtr by a value of
TotFailCtrDecr.
The AES and LRP authentications are initiated by commands sharing the same
command code (First Authentication and Non-First Authentication variants). These
authentication protocols are both AES-based, but differ with regards to the actual
protocol applied and the subsequent secure messaging mode they initiate. An overview
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Secure Messaging
Setup
Authentication
T
y
pe
71h
71h
AuthenticateEV2First
(KeyNo) with
AuthenticateLRPFirst
(KeyNo) with
PCDCap2.1 = 0x00
PCDCap2.1 = 0x02
AES
AES
(128 bit key)
(128 bit key)
Secure messaging using
standard AES construction
see section on
Secure messaging using
LRP AES construction
see section on
EV2 Secure Messaging
LRP Secure Messaging
aaa-032190
Figure 5.ꢀ NTAG 424 DNA TT secure messaging setup
A First Authentication can be executed at any time whether the PICC is in authenticated
or not authenticated state.
The Non-First Authentication can only be executed while the card is in authenticated
state after a successful First or Non-First Authentication.
Correct application of First Authentication and Non-First Authentication allows to
cryptographically bind all messages within a transaction together by the transaction
The following table specifies when to authenticate using First Authentication and when to
use Non-First Authentication.
Table 18.ꢀWhen to use which authentication command
Purpose
First Authentication
Non-First
Authentication
First authentication (i.e. when not in any
authenticated state) with any key different
Allowed
Not Allowed
Subsequent authentication (i.e. when
in any authenticated state) with any key
Allowed, recommended
not to use.
Allowed, recommended
to use.
Allowed
The negotiation between those two variants is done using the capabilities of the First
Authentication and the return message of the first part, where a PCD can distinguish
between standard AES authentication and LRP authentication based on the message
length.
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On First Authentication, the PCD can choose between AES and LRP secure messaging
by setting bit 1 of PCDCap2.1 in the issued command. The PD is configured for either
AES or LRP secure messaging by the setting of bit 1 from PDCap2.1. This setting is
If the PCD chooses for AES secure messaging, it sends PCDCap2.1 equaling 00h (or
no PCDCap2 at all). A NT4H2421Tx will accept the authentication if its PDCap2.1 bit 1
is not set, i.e. the NT4H2421Tx is configured for AES secure messaging. The command
PDCap2.1 bit 1 is set, i.e. the NT4H2421Tx is configured for LRP secure messaging, the
authentication request is rejected.
If the PCD chooses for LRP secure messaging, it sends PCDCap2.1 equaling 02h.
NTAG 424 DNA TT will accept the authentication if its PDCap2.1 bit 1 is set, i.e. the
NT4H2421Tx is configured for LRP secure messaging. The command is interpreted as
AuthenticateLRPFirst
and replied with 18 bytes, i.e. ADDITIONAL_FRAME, followed
by an additional AuthMode indicating LRP secure messaging, and 16 bytes of data,
NT4H2421Tx is configured for AES secure messaging, the authentication request is
composed of ADDITIONAL_FRAME, followed by 16 bytes of data, allowing the PCD to
fall back to standard AES authentication as well.
With Non-First Authentication, the PCD cannot choose between standard AES and
Below table provides possible negotiation outcomes on FirstAuthentication.
Table 19.ꢀSecure messaging mode negotiation
PCD
PD
Mode
PCDCa PDCap2.
RC
resp
resp
comment
p2.1
(Mode)
PDCap2.
PCDCap
Requesting 00h
EV2
Secure
00h
(AES)
ADDITIONAL_
FRAME: 17-byte
response without
AuthMode
00h
00h
Matching, AES SM
accepted and selected
Messaging
02h
(LRP)
PERMISSION_
DENIED
N/A
00h
N/A
02h
No match, AES SM
rejected
Requesting 02h
LRP
Secure
00h
(AES)
ADDITIONAL_
FRAME
No match, PD replies
with AES response,
allowing a PCD to fall
back.
Messaging
02h
(LRP)
ADDITIONAL_
FRAME: 18-byte
response with
AuthMode set to
01h
02h
02h
Matching, LRP SM
accepted and selected
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9.1 AES
Secure Messaging
9.1.1 Transaction
Identifier
In order to avoid interleaving of transactions from multiple PCDs toward one PICC, the
Transaction Identifier (TI) is included in each MAC that is calculated over commands
or responses. The TI is generated by the PICC and communicated to the PCD with a
is 4 bytes and these 4 bytes can hold any value. The TI is treated as a byte array, so
there is no notion of MSB and LSB.
9.1.2 Command
Counter
A command counter is included in the MAC calculation for commands and responses in
order to prevent e.g. replay attacks. It is also used to construct the Initialization Vector
(IV) for encryption and decryption.
Each command, besides few exceptions, see below, is counted by the command counter
CmdCtr which is a 16-bit unsigned integer. Both sides count commands, so the actual
value of the CmdCtr is never transmitted. The CmdCtr is reset to 0000h at PCD and
long as the PICC remains authenticated. In cryptographic calculations, the CmdCtr is
the CmdCtr to 0000h. The CmdCtr is increased between the command and response, for
all communication modes.
When a MAC on a command is calculated at PCD side that includes the CmdCtr, it uses
the current CmdCtr. The CmdCtr is afterwards incremented by 1. At PICC side, a MAC
appended at received commands is checked using the current value of CmdCtr. If the
MAC matches, CmdCtr is incremented by 1 after successful reception of the command,
and before sending a response.
For CommMode.Full, the same holds for both the MAC and encryption IV calculation, i.e.
the non-increased value is used for the command calculations while the increased value
is used for the response calculations.
If the CmdCtr holds the value FFFFh and a command maintaining the active
authentication arrives at the PICC, this leads to an error response and the command is
handled like the MAC was wrong.
is considered as a single command, just as for the other aspects of secure messaging,
and thus the related counter is increased only once.
9.1.3 MAC
Calculation
MACs are calculated using the underlying block cipher according to the CMAC standard
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The MAC used in NT4H2421Tx is truncated by using only the 8 even-numbered bytes
order.
Initialization Vector for MACing
The initialization vector used for the CMAC computation is the zero byte IV as prescribed
[6]
.
9.1.4 Encryption
Encryption and decryption are calculated using AES-128 according to the CBC mode of
always 80h followed, if required, by zero bytes until a string with a length of a multiple
of 16 byte is obtained. Note that if the plain data is a multiple of 16 bytes already, an
additional padding block is added. The only exception is during the authentication itself
The notation
E(key, message)
is used to denote the encryption and
D(key, message)
for
decryption.
Initialization Vector for Encryption
When encryption is applied to the data sent between the PCD and the PICC, the
Initialization Vector (IV) is constructed by encrypting with SesAuthENCKey according to
•
a 2-byte label, distinguishing the purpose of the IV: A55Ah for commands and 5AA5h
for responses
This results in the following IVs:
used in the IV for the encryption of the response.
AuthenticateEV2NonFirst
), the IV will be 128 bits of 0.
9.1.5 AuthenticateEV2First
Command
This section defines the Authentication, which is mandatory to be used first in a
PICC as well as the PCD show in an encrypted way that they possess the same secret,
i.e. the same key. This authentication is supported with AES keys.
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– Part2 received after the successful execution of the first part, the PICC aborts the
ongoing authentication.
During this authentication phase, the PICC accepts messages from the PCD that are
longer than the lengths derived from this specification as long as LenCap is correct.
This feature is to support the upgradability to following generations of NT4H2421Tx. The
PCD rejects answers from the PICC when they don’t have the proper length. Note that if
present, PCDcap2:1:Bit1 must not be set, otherwise LRP authentication is targeted, see
The PICC generates a random 16-byte challenge
RndB
and send this encrypted to
generate a random Transaction Identifier (TI).
generates a random 16-byte challenge
RndA
. The PCD encrypts, on his turn, the
concatenation of
RndA
with
RndB’
, which is the received challenge after decryption
message and validates the received
RndB’
. If not as expected, the command is rejected.
Else it generates
RndA’
by rotating left the received
RndA
by one byte. This is returned
together with the generated TI. Also, the PICC sends 12 bytes of capabilities to the PCD:
6 bytes of PICC capabilities PDcap2 and 6 bytes of PCD capabilities PCDcap2 that were
received on the command (sent back for verification).
both to the value sent from the PCD to the PICC and to the value used in the encrypted
response message from the PICC to the PCD where in this case the PCDcap2 is the
adjusted version of the originally sent PCDcap2: i.e. truncated or padded with zero bytes
to a length of 6 bytes if needed.
On successful execution of the authentication protocol, the session keys
PICC is in EV2 authenticated state and the Secure Messaging is activated. On any
in not authenticated state.
If there is a mismatch between the capabilities expected by the PCD and the capabilities
presented by the PICC to the PCD (both the PDcap2 and the echoed/adjusted
PCDcap2), it is the responsibility of the PCD to take the proper actions based on the
application the PCD is running. This decision is outside the scope of this specification.
9.1.6 AuthenticateEV2NonFirst
Command
This section defines the Non-First Authentication, which is recommended to be used if
well as the PCD show in an encrypted way that they possess the same secret, i.e. the
same key. This authentication is supported with AES keys.
AuthenticateEV2NonFirst
– Part2. Detailed command definition can be found in
Section 11.4.2
. This command is rejected if there is no active authentication, except if the
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AuthenticateEV2First
, except for the following differences:
•
No
PCDcap2
and
PDcap2
are exchanged and validated.
After successful authentication, the PICC remains in EV2 authenticated state. On any
failure during the protocol, the PICC ends up in not authenticated state.
9.1.7 Session
Key Generation
AuthenticateEV2NonFirst
, both the PICC and the PCD generate two session keys for
•
SesAuthMACKey for MACing of messages
•
SesAuthENCKey for encryption and decryption of messages
Note that these identifiers are also used in context of the LRP protocol, though the actual
PCD
PICC
AES Key K
AES Key K
x
x
N
T
AG Authentication
RndA
RndB
RndA
RndB
KDF
KDF
SesAuthENCKey = AES
Session Key for encryption
SesAuthMACKey = AES
Session Key for MAC
SesAuthENCKey = AES
Session Key for encryption
SesAuthMACKey = AES
Session Key for MAC
aaa-032481
Figure 6.ꢀ Session key generation for Secure Messaging
The Pseudo Random Function PRF(key; message) applied during the key generation
key derivation key is the key Kx that was applied during authentication. As the
authentications are restricted to target AES keys, the generated session keys are also of
AES.
SP 800-108 allows defining a different order than proposed by the standard as long as it
is unambiguously defined.
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•
a 2-byte label, distinguishing the purpose of the key: 5AA5h for MACing and A55Ah for
encryption
•
a 2-byte counter, fixed to 0001h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a 2-byte length, fixed to 0080h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a 26-byte context, constructed using the two random numbers exchanged, RndA and
RndB
First, the 32-byte input session vectors
SV
x
are derived as follows:
SV1 = A5h||5Ah||00h||01h||00h||80h||RndA[15..14]||
ꢀꢀꢀ
( RndA[13..8]
#
RndB[15..10])||RndB[9..0]||RndA[7..0]
SV2 = 5Ah||A5h||00h||01h||00h||80h||RndA[15..14]||
ꢀꢀꢀ
( RndA[13..8]
#
RndB[15..10])||RndB[9..0]||RndA[7..0]
with
#
being the XOR-operator.
Then, the 16-byte session keys are constructed as follows:
SesAuthENCKey = PRF(K
x
, SV1)
SesAuthMACKey = PRF(K
x
, SV2)
9.1.8 Plain
Communication Mode
C = Value of CmdCtr at start of this sequence
1
1
1
1
1
[a]
ISO 7816 Data Field
CmdHeader CmdData
[b]
1
Command counter (CmdCtr)
incremented after validating the
command before sending the
response. CmdCtr is a 16-bit
unsigned integer.
CLA
90h
P1
00h 00h
P2
Le
00h
PCD to PICC
CMD
Lc
[c]
RespData
1
1
status
SW1 SW2
aaa-032773
PICC to PCD
Figure 7.ꢀPlain Communication Mode
However, note that, as the PICC is in authenticated state (EV2 authenticated state or
LRP authenticated state), the command counter CmdCtr is still increased as defined in
This allows the PCD and PICC to detect any insertion and/or deletion of commands sent
in CommMode.Plain on any subsequent command that is sent in CommMode.MAC (e.g.
CommitTransaction
) or CommMode.Full.
9.1.9 MAC
Communication Mode
In case MAC is to be applied, the following holds. The MAC is calculated using
the current session key SesAuthMACKey. MAC calculation is done as defined in
For commands, the MAC is calculated over the following data (according to the
•
Command, Cmd
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•
Command header – CmdHeader (if present)
•
Command data – CmdData (if present)
For responses, the MAC is calculated over the following data in this order:
•
Return code – RC
•
Response data – RespData (if present)
increased between the computation of the MAC on the command and the MAC on the
In case of command chaining, the MAC calculation is not interrupted. The MAC is
calculated over the data including the complete data field (i.e. either CmdData or
RespData of all frames) at once. The MAC is always transmitted by appending to the
unpadded plain command. If necessary, an additional frame is sent. If a MAC over the
command is received, the PICC verifies the MAC and rejects commands that do not
contain a valid MAC by returning INTEGRITY_ERROR.
The authentication state is immediately lost and the error return code is sent without a
MAC appended. Note that any other error during the command execution has the same
consequences.
C = value of CmdCtr at start of this sequence
T = Value of TI (will stay constant)
8
1
1
1
1
1
[a]
[b]
1
Command counter (CmdCtr)
ISO 7816 Data Field
incremented after validating the
command before sending the
response and related MAC calculation
MACt(SesAuthMACKey, CMD ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| CmdHeader] [|| CmdData])
CLA
90h
P1
00h 00h
P2
Le
00h
PCD to PICC
Cmd
Lc
CmdHeader
CmdData
MAC(SesAuthMACKey, CMD || CmdCtr || TI
[|| CmdHeader] [|| CmdData])
MAC Truncation from 16 to 8 byte
by use of the even-numbered bytes
1
2
CmdCtr
C
4
TI
T
[a]
[b]
ISO 7816 Data Field
Cmd
CmdHeader
CmdData
[c]
8
1
1
status
MACt(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
R
C ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| RespData])
PICC to PCD
RespData
SW1 SW2
MAC(SesAuthMACKey, RC ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| RespData])
2
4
TI
T
[c]
1
status
CmdCtr
C+1
RespData
SW2
aaa-032192
CLA, P1, P2, LC, Le and SW1 not included in secure messaging calculation. SW2 is the return
code (RC) and appended in the beginning for secure messaging calculation
Figure 8.ꢀ Secure Messaging: MAC Communication mode
9.1.10 Full
Communication Mode
The Secure Messaging applies encryption (CommMode.Full) to all commands listed
The encryption/decryption is calculated using the current session key SesAuthENCKey.
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data field (i.e. CmdData or RespData). Note that none of the commands have a data field
in both the command and the response frame.
After the encryption, the command and response frames are handled as with MAC.
This means that additionally a MAC is calculated and appended for transmission using
the current session key SesAuthMACKey. This is exactly done as specified for MAC
E(SesAuthENCKey; CmdData)
or
E(SesAuthENCKey; RespData)
. The complete
decryption is applied over the complete data field (i.e. of all frames). If necessary, due to
the padding or the MAC added, an additional frame is sent. If encryption of the command
is required, after the MAC verification as described for MAC, the PICC verifies and
removes the padding bytes. Commands without a valid padding are also rejected by
returning INTEGRITY_ERROR.
The authentication state is immediately lost and the error return code is sent without a
MAC appended. Note that any other error during the command execution has the same
consequences.
[b]
p
C = value of CmdCtr at start of this sequence
T = Value of TI (will stay constant)
CmdData
Padding
8
1
1
1
1
1
[a]
[b+p]
ISO 7816 Data Field
1
Command counter (CmdCtr)
incremented after validating the
command before sending the
response and related MAC calculation
MACt(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
C
MD || CmdCtr
CmdHeader E(SesAuthENCKe
y
,
C
mdData) ||
TI [|| CmdHeader] [|| E(Ke, CmdData)])
CLA
90h
P1
00h 00h
P2
Le
PCD to PICC
Cmd
Lc
MAC(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
C
MD || CmdCtr || TI
[|| CmdHeader] [|| E(Ke, CmdData])
MAC Truncation from 16 to 8 byte
by use of the even-numbered bytes
1
2
4
TI
T
[a]
CmdHeader
[b+p]
ISO 7816 Data Field
Cmd CmdCtr
C
E(SesAuthENCKey, CmdData)
[c]
p
RespData
Padding
[c+p]
E(SesAuthENCKey, RespData)
8
1
1
status
MACt(SesAuthMACKey, RC ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| E(Ke, RespData)])
SW1 SW2
PICC to PCD
MAC(SesAuthMACKey, RC ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| E(Ke, RespData)])
1
2
4
TI
T
[c+p]
status
SW2
CmdCtr
C+1
E(SesAuthENCKey, RespData)
aaa-032193
Figure 9.ꢀ
Secure Messaging: CommMode.Full
9.2 LRP
Secure Messaging
The LRP Secure Messaging is using AES-128 to construct a Leakage Resilient Primitive.
This way, it allows side-channel resistant implementation.
Like the AES secure messaging, this secure messaging mode is managed by commands
To distinguish and ease the descriptions, they are renamed for the LRP case into
on when to use one or the other command also apply for LRP secure messaging.
9.2.1 Transaction
identifier
The Transaction Identifier (TI) is treated exactly in the same way by LRP secure
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9.2.2 Command
counter
The Command counter (CmdCtr) is treated exactly in the same way by LRP secure
9.2.3 MAC
calculation
MACs are computed by using a CMAC construction on top of the LRP primitive. This is
MAC
LRP
(key,message) = CMAC_LRP(4,key, Len(message),message)
Note that in the LRP context a key is not purely a single value, but rather consists of
the associated set of plain texts, an updated key and in context of CMAC also the
calculated inside.
MACt
LRP
(key, message)
denotes the CMAC after truncation to 8 bytes which is identical
to the truncation of the AES secure messaging i.e. the even-numbered bytes are retained
The initialization vector used for the CMAC computation is the zero byte IV as prescribed
[10]
.
9.2.4 Encryption
Encryption and decryption are calculated using a Leakage Resilient Indexed CodeBook
For this purpose an Encryption Counter is maintained: EncCtr is a 32-bit unsigned
integer as Input Vector (IV) for encryption/decryption. The EncCtr is reset to 000000000h
AuthenticateLRPNonFirst
targeting LRP. The counter is incremented during each
encryption/decryption of each 16-byte block. i.e. for 64-byte encryption/decryption
the EncCtr is increased by 5 due to 4 blocks of 16-byte of data plus one block of
the response of part 2, so the actual secure messaging starts from 00000001h. For
AuthenticateLRPNonFirst
, secure messaging starts from 00000000h as the counter is not
used during the authentication. EncCtr is further maintained as long as the PICC remains
represented MSB first.
always 80h followed, if required, by zero bytes until a string with a length of a multiple
of 16 bytes is obtained. Note that if the plain data is a multiple of 16 bytes already, an
additional padding block is added. The only exception is during the authentication itself
and
D
LRP
(key, ciphertext)
for the complementary decryption operation. Note that in the
LRP context a key is not purely a single value, but rather consists of the associated set
the operation.
Note that the EncCtr cannot overflow. Due to the supported file sizes, the CmdCtr will
always expire before.
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Note that the MSB representation of EncCtr is different from other counter
representations in this specification, but allows saving some AES calculations in the key
stream generation.
9.2.5 AuthenticateLRPFirst
command
AuthenticateEV2First
. The distinction is made via the PCDCap2.1 parameter, as
The protocol cannot be interrupted by other commands. On any command different from
AuthenticateLRPFirst
– Part2 received after the successful execution of the first part, the
PICC aborts the ongoing authentication.
During this authentication phase, the PICC accepts messages from the PCD that are
longer than the lengths derived from this specification as long as
LenCap
is correct. This
feature is to support the upgradability to following generations of NTAG 424 DNA TT.
resulting into 020000000000h, the content of PCDCap2 is not interpreted by the PICC.
The PCD rejects answers from the PICC when they don’t have the proper length.
the OriginalityKey.
The PICC generates a random 16-byte challenge
RndB
and send this in plain to the
PCD. Additionally, the PICC and PCD reset both CmdCtr and EncCtr to zero and
generate a random TI.
generates a random 16-byte challenge
RndA
. Now the PCD calculates the session keys
for LRP, a session key consists of a set of plain texts and an updated key.
Then the PCDResponse computes a MAC over the concatenation of
RndA
with
RndB
,
the concatenation of
RndA
and this MAC is sent to the PICC.
MAC. If not as expected, the command is rejected. Else it encrypts the generated TI
concatenated with 12 bytes of capabilities to the PCD: 6 bytes of PICC capabilities
PDCap2
and 6 bytes of PCD capabilities
PCDCap2
that were received on the command
SesAuthENCKey.
both to the value sent from the PCD to the PICC and to the value used in the encrypted
response message from the PICC to the PCD where in this case the
PCDCap2
is the
adjusted version of the originally sent
PCDCap2
: i.e. truncated or padded with zero
bytes to a length of 6 bytes if needed. After that encryption, the PICCResponse will also
compute a MAC over the concatenation of
RndB
,
RndA
and the encrypted data.
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9.2.6 AuthenticateLRPNonFirst
command
This section defines the LRP Non-First Authentication, which is recommended to be used
AuthenticateLRPNonFirst
Part2. Detailed command definition can be found in
This command is rejected if there is no active LRP authentication, except if the targeted
following differences:
•
PCDCap2 and PDCap2 are not exchanged and validated
•
TI is not reset and not exchanged
•
CmdCtr is not reset
After successful authentication, the PICC remains in LRP authenticated state, except if
any failure during the protocol, the PICC ends up in not authenticated state.
9.2.7 Session
key generation
Next to the algorithms for MAC calculation and encryption, one of the major differences
between the LRP secure messaging and the AES secure messaging is that the
session keys are generated and already applied during the authentication with
Also for the LRP protocol, two keys are generated:
•
SesAuthMACKey for MACing of messages
•
SesAuthENCKey for encryption and decryption of messages
related to these session keys are computed. In the remainder of the document, when
the session key is applied in the LRP context the combination of those plain texts and
updated key is meant.
The Pseudo Random Function
PRF(key; message)
applied during the key generation
authentication. Note that from this key a set of plaintexts and updated key is computed,
so the static key is only used in this derivation. The generated session keys are AES
NIST SP 800-108 allows defining a different order than proposed by the standard as long
as it is unambiguously defined.
•
a 2-byte counter, fixed to 0001h as only 128-bit keys are generated
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•
a 2-byte length, fixed to 0080h as only 128-bit keys are generated
•
a 26-byte context, constructed using the two random numbers exchanged,
RndA
and
RndB
•
a 2-byte label: 9669h
Firstly, the 32-byte input session vector
SV
is derived as follows:
SV = 00h || 01h || 00h || 80h || RndA[15::14] ||
ꢀꢀ
(RndA[13::8]
#
RndB[15::10]) || RndB[9::0] || RndA[7::0] || 96h || 69h
with
#
being the XOR-operator.
Then, the session key material is constructed as follows:
ꢀ
AuthSPT = generatePlaintexts(4; K
x
)
ꢀ
{AuthUpdateKey} = generateUpdatedKeys(1; K
x
)
ꢀ
SesAuthMasterKey = MACLRP (K
x
; SV )
ꢀ
SesAuthSPT = generatePlaintexts(4; SesAuthMasterKey)
ꢀ
{SesAuthMACUpdateKey; SesAuthENCUpdateKey} = generateUpdatedKeys(2;
SesAuthMasterKey)
the output of
generateUpdatedKeys
is shown in the order that the keys are generated.
The actual SesAuthMACKey then consists for LRP of the set of plaintexts SesAuthSPT
(consisting of 16 16-byte values) and SesAuthMACUpdateKey. The SesAuthENCKey
consists of the same set of plaintexts SesAuthSPT and SesAuthENCUpdateKey.
9.2.8 Plain
communication mode
For CommMode.Plain, command processing in LRP authenticated state is identical to
9.2.9 MAC
communication mode
command processing in LRP authenticated state is identical to AES secure messaging in
C = value of CmdCtr at start of this sequence
T = Value of TI (will stay constant)
8
1
1
1
1
1
[a]
[b]
1
Command counter (CmdCtr)
ISO 7816 Data Field
incremented after validating the
command before sending the
response and related MAC calculation
MACt(SesAuthMACKey, CMD ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| CmdHeader] [|| CmdData])
CLA
90h
P1
00h 00h
P2
Le
00h
PCD to PICC
Cmd
Lc
CmdHeader
CmdData
MAC
(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
C
MD || CmdCtr || TI
[|| CmdHeader] [|| CmdData])
MAC Truncation from 16 to 8 byte
by use of the even-numbered bytes
LRP
1
2
CmdCtr
C
4
TI
T
[a]
[b]
ISO 7816 Data Field
Cmd
CmdHeader
CmdData
[c]
8
1
1
status
MACt(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
R
C ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| RespData])
PICC to PCD
RespData
SW1 SW2
MAC(SesAuthMACKey, RC ||
CmdCtr || TI [|| RespData])
2
4
TI
T
[c]
1
status
CmdCtr
C+1
RespData
SW2
aaa-032194
Figure 10.ꢀLRP Secure Messaging: MAC Protection Mode
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9.2.10 Full
communication mode
For CommMode.Full, apart from using the LRP encryption and MAC algorithm, as
[b]
p
C = value of CmdCtr at start of this sequence
T = Value of TI (will stay constant)
CmdData
Padding
8
1
1
1
1
1
[a]
[b+p]
1
Command counter (CmdCtr)
ISO 7816 Data Field
incremented after validating the
command before sending the
response and related MAC calculation
MACt
LRP
(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
C
MD || CmdCtr || TI [||
(SesAuthENCKey, CmdData)])
Le
00h
CLA
90h
P1
00h 00h
P2
PCD to PICC
Cmd
Lc
CmdHeader
E
LRP
(SesAuthENCKey, CmdData)
CmdHeader] [|| E
LRP
MACt
LRP
CmdHeader] [|| E
(SesAuthMACKe
y
,
C
MD || CmdCtr || TI [||
MAC Truncation from 16 to 8 byte
by use of the even-numbered bytes
(SesAuthENCKey, CmdData)])
LRP
1
2
4
TI
T
[a]
[b+p]
ISO 7816 Data Field
(SesAuthENCKey, CmdData)
Cmd
CmdCtr
C
CmdHeader
E
LRP
[c]
p
RespData
Padding
[c+p]
8
1
1
status
MAC
LRP
|| TI [|| E
(SesAuthMACKe
y
, RC
|
| CmdCtr
PICC to PCD
E (SesAuthENCKey,
RespData)
LRP
(SesAuthENCKey, RespData)])
SW1 SW2
LRP
MAC
(SesAuthMACKe
y
, RC
|
| CmdCtr
LRP
|| TI [|| E
(SesAuthENCKey, RespData)])
LRP
1
2
4
TI
T
[c+p]
status
SW2
CmdCtr
C+1
E
(SesAuthENCKey, RespData)
LRP
aaa-032195
Figure 11.ꢀLRP Secure Messaging: CommMode.Full
9.3 Secure
Dynamic Messaging
The Secure Dynamic Messaging (SDM) allows for confidential and integrity protected
data exchange, without requiring a preceding authentication. NT4H2421Tx supports
SDM for reading from one of the StandardData files on the PICC. Secure Dynamic
Messaging allows adding security to the data read, while still being able to access it with
standard NDEF readers. The typical use case is an NDEF holding a URI and some meta-
data, where SDM allows this meta-data to be communicated confidentiality and integrity
protected toward a backend server.
When using SDM, residual risks coming with the Secure Dynamic Messaging for
Reading have to be taken into account. As SDM allows free reading of the secured
message, i.e. without any up-front reader authentication, anybody can read out the
message. This means that also a potential attacker is able to read out and store one ore
multiple messages, and play them at a later point in time to the verifier.
If this residual risk is not acceptable for the system’s use case, the legacy mutual
authentication (using challenge response protocol) and subsequent secure messaging
should be applied. This would require using an own application and operating outside a
standard NDEF read operation.
Other risk mitigation may be applied for SDM to limit the residual risk, without completely
removing it:
•
Track SDMReadCtr per tag at the verifying side. Reject SDMReadCtr values that have
been seen before or that are played out-of-order. This is a minimum requirement any
verifier should implement.
•
Limit the time window of an attacker by requiring tags to be presented regularly (e.g. at
least once a day) in combination with the previous mitigation.
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•
Read out the SDM-protected file more than once. This does not protect against
attackers that have read out the valid tag also multiple times and play the received
responses in the same sequence.
9.3.1 SDM
Read Counter
In order to allow replay detection by the party validating the data read, a read counter is
associated with the file for which Secure Dynamic Messaging is enabled.
SDMReadCtr is a 24-bit unsigned integer. The SDMReadCtr is reset to 000000h when
with binary encoding on the external interface, the SDMReadCtr is represented LSB first.
When represented with ASCII encoding on the contactless interface, it is represented
In not Authenticated state, the SDMReadCtr is incremented by 1 before calculating the
subsequent read commands targeting the same file, the SDMReadCtr is not increased,
and the current value is used. As soon as a different command has been received,
the counter is incremented again on a subsequent read command. Also when varying
instance of the read command type. Note that the SDMReadCtr is not incremented when
authenticated.
FFFFFFh (if SDMReadCtrLimit is not enabled) and a first read command arrives at
additionally affect the counter increase. The chained command is considered as a single
command.
SDMReadCtr can be retrieved via the mirroring as part of the PICCData, see
9.3.2 SDM
Read Counter Limit
In order to allow limiting the number of reads that can be done with a single device
applying Secure Dynamic Messaging, an optional SDM Read Counter Limit can be
configured. There are two main use cases:
•
limit the number of usages from the card side. Note that typically this can also be
controlled from the backend verifying the SDM for Read protected message.
•
limit the number of traces that can be collected on the symmetric crypto processing.
This way potential side channel attacks can be mitigated, see also the Failed
Authentication Counter feature for the mutual authentication. In this case, it is
recommended to have the configured limit aligned with TotFailCtrLimit.
The number of reads that can be executed for an SDM configured file can be limited by
setting an SDM Read Counter Limit (SDMReadCtrLimit). This is an unsigned integer of 3
bytes, related with SDMReadCtr. On the interface, the SDMReadCtrLimit is represented
LSB first. The SDMReadCtrLimit can be enabled by setting a customized value with
Once the SDMReadCtr equals the SDMReadCtrLimit, no reading of the file with
if authenticated, reading is always possible even if SDMReadCtrLimit is reached,
applying the regular secure messaging. If the SDMReadCtrLimit is disabled with
ChangeFileSettings
, this is also equivalent to putting it to the maximum value: FFFFFFh.
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9.3.3 PICCData
The PICCData holds metadata of the targeted PICC and file, consisting of the UID and/or
the SDMReadCtr. Whether PICCData is transmitted in plain or encrypted depends on the
SDMMetaRead access right is configured for free access (Eh), PICCData is plain and is
ASCII mirroring is reflected by the function EncodeASCII(), which means that each
hexadecimal character of the hexadecimal representation will be ASCII encoded using
capitals. For example, the UID 04E141124C2880h becomes: 30h 34h 45h 31h 34h 31h
31h 32h 34h 43h 32h 38h 38h 30h.
Table 20.ꢀPICCData: plain encoding and lengths
Mode
ASCII
ASCII
PICCData Value
Length with 7-byte UID
EncodeASCII(UID)
UIDLength = 14 (i.e. 2*UIDLen)
SDMReadCtrLength = 6 (i.e. 2*3)
EncodeASCII(SDMReadCtr)
ASCII case. If the SDMMetaRead access right is configured for an application key,
for the encryption is always in binary encoding, while the output ciphertext will be ASCII
encoded.
the related offsets.
In case of plain mirroring (i.e. access right SDMMetaRead = Eh):
•
UIDOffset configures the UID mirroring position. It is only given if UID mirroring is
enabled.
•
SDMReadCtrOffset configures the SDMReadCtr mirroring position. It is only given if
SDMReadCtr mirroring is enabled. Note that it is possible to enable the SDMReadCtr
but without mirroring by putting SDMReadCtrOffset to FFFFFFh. In this case it can be
If UID and SDMReadCtr are mirrored within the file, they shall not overlap:
•
UIDOffset ≥ SDMReadCtrOffset + SDMReadCtrLength OR SDMReadCtrOffset ≥
UIDOffset + UIDLength.
In case of encrypted mirroring (i.e. SDMMetaRead = 0h..4h), PICCDataOffset configures
If the PICCData is mirrored within the file, the mirroring shall always be applied in not
authenticated state, independently of whether Secure Dynamic Messaging applies. This
means it will also be applied if reading the file with free access due to Read or ReadWrite
access right. Note that if authenticated, no mirroring is done, i.e. the regular secure
messaging is always applied on the static file data.
With NT4H2421Tx, PICCData is always ASCII encoded.
When both the UID and SDMReadCtr are mirrored, “x” (78h) is used as a separator
the placeholders defined by UIDOffset and SDMReadCtrOffset, and writing “x” (78h) in
the static file data.
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9.3.4 Encryption
of PICCData
In case of encrypted PICCData mirroring (both binary and ASCII), PICCDataTag
specifies what metadata is mirrored, together with the length of the UID if mirrored, as
Table 21.ꢀPICCDataTag
Bit
Value
Description
UID mirroring
disabled
Bit7
–
0
1
enabled
Bit6
–
SDMReadCtr mirroring
disabled
0
1
enabled
Bit5-4
Bit3-0
00
–
RFU
UID Length
RFU (if UID is not mirrored)
7 byte UID
0h
7h
The format of the plain text is:
PICCDataTag [ || UID] [|| SDMReadCtr].
To ensure that the encrypted PICCData cannot be abused for tracking purposes, random
padding is added to the actual plain text input.
random padding is reused. This allows for reading the file in chunks, where a chunk
border might even be in the middle of the encrypted PICCData. As soon as a different
command has been received, fresh random padding is generated on a subsequent read
padding is generated.
SDMMetaRead access right.
9.3.4.1 AES
mode encryption
Encryption and decryption of the PICCData are calculated using the underlying block
Therefore PICCData is defined as follows:
RandomPadding)
byte string generated by the PICC to make the input 16 bytes long. Note that because of
the ASCII encoding the required placeholder length doubles.
9.3.4.2 LRP
mode encryption
Encryption and decryption of the PICCData are calculated using a leakage resilient
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For this operation, the LRP key material is constructed as follows:
As input counter for the CTR construction, the 8-byte random PICCRand, generated by
the PICC, is used. Apart from the counter applied, this is identical to the encryption used
Therefore PICCData is defined as follows:
SDMReadCtr] || RandomPadding)
random byte string generated by the PICC. RandomPadding is applied like for AES
mode.
The required placeholder length in the NDEF message is 48 bytes due to ASCII
encoding.
Note that due to the different sizes of encrypted PICCData with AES mode and LRP
mode, the Secure Dynamic Messaging and mirroring will be disabled when switching
9.3.5 Tag
Tamper Status
mirror the tag tamper status TTStatus consisting of TTPermStatus and TTCurrStatus.
They are mirrored concatenated in the following order: TTPermStatus || TTCurrStatus.
They can be mirrored in plain or encrypted.
For the latter, TTStatusOffset needs to be positioned within the placeholder for the
the static file data is replaced by the dynamic statuses before applying the encryption.
Note however, that either both status bytes are plain or both are encrypted. As the
TTPermStatus and TTCurrStatus are already ASCII encoded, no ASCII encoding is
applied on top, and only a 2-byte placeholder is used. Where the status is mirrored within
The restrictions on this offset shall be that it may not be overlapping with any PICCData
mirrored or with the SDMMAC.
If the TTPermStatus is mirrored within the file, the mirroring shall always be applied in not
authenticated state, independently of whether Secure Dynamic Messaging applies. This
means it will also be applied if reading the file with free access due to Read or ReadWrite
access right. Note that if authenticated, no mirroring is done, i.e. the regular secure
messaging is always applied on the static file data.
9.3.6 SDMENCFileData
SDM for Reading supports mirroring (part of the) file data encrypted. This part is called
the SDMENCFileData.
If the SDMFileRead access right is configured for an application key, part of the file
authenticated state.
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In this case, the input plaintext for the encryption is always in binary encoding, while the
output ciphertext is ASCII encoded.
Note that if authenticated, no Secure Dynamic Messaging is applied, i.e. the regular
secure messaging is always applied on the static file data.
The SDMENCFileData (if any) is always mirrored within the file. This is configured with
SDMFileRead access right is disabling Secure Dynamic Messaging for reading (i.e. set to
If PICCData is mirrored within the file, SDMENCFileData shall not overlap with it.
Depending on what is exactly mirrored, the following holds:
•
SDMENCOffset ≥ PICCDataOffset + PICCDataLength OR PICCDataOffset ≥
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength.
•
SDMENCOffset ≥ UIDOffset + UIDLength OR UIDOffset ≥ SDMENCOffset +
SDMENCLength.
•
SDMENCOffset ≥ SDMReadCtrOffset + SDMReadCtrLength OR SDMReadCtrOffset ≥
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength.
It shall be ensured that SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength is smaller than or equal to the
file size. Note that as the SDMMAC is as well mirrored into the file, additional conditions
ASCII encoding. With NT4H2421Tx, only ASCII encoding is supported.
9.3.7 Encryption
of SDMENCFileData
The key applied for the encryption is a session key SesSDMFileReadENCKey derived
from the application key defined by the SDMFileRead access right as specified in
From user point of view, the SDMENCOffset and SDMENCLength define a placeholder
within the file where the plain data is to be stored when writing the file.
For ASCII encoding, only the first half of the placeholder is used for storing the plain data,
the second half is ignored for constructing the returned data when reading with SDM. For
example, if targeting to encrypt 2 AES blocks, i.e. 32 bytes, a placeholder of 64 bytes is
reserved via SDMENCOffset and SDMENCLength. The first 32 bytes hold the plaintext,
and the next 32 bytes are ignored when reading with Secure Dynamic Messaging.
9.3.7.1 AES
mode encryption
Encryption and decryption of the SDMENCFileData are calculated using the underlying
applied:
IV = E(SesSDMFileReadENCKey; SDMReadCtr||00000000000000000000000000h)
with SDMReadCtr LSB first.
For applying SDM with ASCII encoding, the SDMENCFileData is defined as follows:
SDMENCFileData = E(SesSDMFileReadENCKey; StaticFileData[SDMENCOffset::
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength=2 – 1])
with StaticFileData being the current file data as written in the placeholder. The file
configuration ensures via SDMENCLength that the input is a multiple of 16 bytes, so no
padding is applied.
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Note that it is possible via the read command parameters to read-only part of the file. If
the SDMENCFileData is partially read as per the issued offset and length, a truncated
part of the ciphertext will be returned. As truncation might happen in the middle of an
AES block, this means subsequent read commands to fetch the remainder of the file
might be required to be able to decrypt.
9.3.7.2 LRP
mode encryption
Encryption and decryption of the SDMENCFileData are calculated using a leakage
resilient indexed codebook (LRICB) construction on top of the LRP primitive: LRICB of
[10]
.
As input counter for the CTR construction, a 6-byte counter is used, consisting of
the concatenation of SDMReadCtr and three zero bytes: SDMReadCtr || 000000h.
SDMReadCtr is LSB first. After concatenation the 6-byte are treated as unsigned integer
for the counting.
Apart from the counter applied, this is identical to the encryption used for LRP secure
If applying SDM with ASCII encoding, the SDMENCFileData is defined as follows:
SDMENCFileData = E
LRP
(SesSDMFileReadENCKey; StaticFileData[SDMENCOffset …
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength/2 – 1])
with StaticFileData being the file data as it was written in the placeholder. The file
configuration ensures via SDMENCLength that the input is a multiple of 16 bytes. No
padding is applied.
9.3.8 SDMMAC
SDM for Reading supports calculating a MAC over the response data. This message
authentication code is called the SDMMAC.
If SDMFileRead access right is configured for an application key, a MAC will be
The SDMMAC is to be mirrored within the file via SDMMACOffset. This is configured with
If SDMMAC is mirrored within the file, it is limited to start only after SDMENCFileData, i.e.
SDMMACOffset ≥ SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength. The SDMMACInputOffset must
ensure that the complete SDMENCFileData is included in the MAC calculation.
As the mirrored SDMMAC is ASCII encoded, the output size doubles to 16 bytes.
It shall be ensured that SDMMACOffset + SDMMACLength is smaller or equal than the
file size. Note that if authenticated, no Secure Dynamic Messaging is applied and the
placeholder data at SDMMACOffset is not replaced, i.e. the regular secure messaging is
always applied on the static file data.
The SDMMACInputOffset will define from which position in the file the MAC calculation
starts. If SDMMAC is mirrored within the file, SDMMACInputOffset must be smaller than
or equal to SDMMACOffset.
MACing is mandatory if the SDMFileRead access right is configured for an application
key. If the SDMFileRead access right is disabling Secure Dynamic Messaging for
reading (i.e. set to Fh), SDMMACOffset and SDMMACInputOffset are not present in
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With NT4H2421Tx, only ASCII encoding is supported. SDMMAC is always mirrored
within the file.
9.3.9 MAC
Calculation
The key applied for the MAC calculation is a session key SesSDMFileReadMACKey
derived from the application key defined by the SDMFileRead access right, as specified
9.3.9.1 AES
mode MAC calculation
The 8-byte SDMMAC is calculated using AES according to the CMAC standard
The SDMMAC is defined as follows:
SDMMAC = MACt (SesSDMFileReadMACKey; DynamicFileData[SDMMACInputOffset …
SDMMACOffset – 1])
with DynamicFileData being the file data as how it is put on the contactless interface, i.e.
replacing any placeholders by the dynamic data.
9.3.9.2 LRP
mode MAC calculation
The 8-byte SDMMAC is calculated using a CMAC construction on top of the LRP
applying the same truncation.
Therefore SDMMAC is defined as follows:
SDMMAC = MACt
LRP
(SesSDMFileReadMACKey;
DynamicFileData[SDMMACInputOffset … SDMMACOffset – 1])
with DynamicFileData being the file data as how it is put on the contactless interface, i.e.
replacing any placeholders by the dynamic data.
9.3.10 SDM
Session Key Generation
For Secure Dynamic Messaging for reading, the following session keys are calculated:
•
SesSDMFileReadMACKey for MACing of file data.
•
SesSDMFileReadENCKey for encryption of file data
The pseudo random function applied during the key generation is the CMAC algorithm
SDMFileReadKey
as configured with the SDMFileRead access right.
9.3.10.1 AES
mode session key generation for SDM
SP 800-108 allows defining a different order than proposed by the standard as long as it
is unambiguously defined.
•
a 2-byte label, distinguishing the purpose of the key: 3CC3h for MACing and C33Ch for
encryption.
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•
a 2-byte counter, fixed to 0001h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a 2-byte length, fixed to 0080h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a context, constructed using the UID and/or SDMReadCtr, followed by zero-byte
padding if needed.
Firstly, the input session vectors SV x are derived as follows:
SV1 = C3h || 3Ch || 00h || 01h || 00h || 80h || UID || SDMReadCtr
SV2 = 3Ch || C3h || 00h || 01h || 00h || 80h [ || UID] [ || SDMReadCtr] [ || ZeroPadding]
Whether or not the UID and/or SDMReadCtr are included in session vector SV2,
file data, mirroring of both is mandatory.
Therefore they are always included in SV1.
Padding with zeros is done up to a multiple of 16 bytes. So in case of 7-byte UID and
both elements are mirrored, no padding is added. Then, the 16-byte session keys are
constructed as follows:
9.3.10.2 LRP
mode session key generation for SDM
SP 800-108 allows defining a different order than proposed by the standard as long as it
is unambiguously defined.
•
a 2-byte counter, fixed to 0001h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a 2-byte length, fixed to 0080h as only 128-bit keys are generated.
•
a context, constructed using the UID and/or SDMReadCtr, followed by zero-byte
padding if needed.
•
a 2-byte label: 1EE1h
Firstly, the input session vector SV is derived as follows:
SV = 00h || 01h || 00h || 80h [ || UID] [ || SDMReadCtr] [ || ZeroPadding] || 1Eh || E1h
Whether or not the UID and/or SDMReadCtr are included in the session vectors,
file data, mirroring of both is mandatory. Padding with zeros is done up to a multiple of
16 bytes. So in case of 7-byte UID and both elements are mirrored, no padding is added.
Then, the session key material is constructed as follows:
SesSDMFileReadSPT = generatePlaintexts(4; SesSDMFileReadMasterKey)
{SesSDMFileReadMACUpdateKey; SesSDMFileReadENCUpdateKey} =
generateUpdatedKeys(2; SesSDMFileReadMasterKey)
output of generateUpdatedKeys is shown in the order that the keys are generated.
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The actual SesSDMFileReadMACKey then consists for LRP of the set of
plaintexts SesSDMFileReadSPT (consisting of 16 16-byte values) and
SesSDMFileReadMACUpdateKey. The SesSDMFileReadENCKey consists of the same
set of plaintexts SesSDMFileReadSPT and SesSDMFileReadENCUpdateKey.
9.3.11 Output
Mapping Examples
The following figure shows an example with the static file content and how it will be read.
Static File Output
VCUID-
Offset
+ 14
SDMRead-
CtrOffset
+ 6
TTStatus
Offset
+ 2
SDMENCOffset
+
SDMENCLength/2
SDMMACOffset
SDMRead-
CtrOffset
Plain
File
Data
TTStatus
Offset
Plain Place
SDMENCOffset
VCUIDOffset
+
SDMMACOffset
+ 16
SDMENCOffset
holder Plain
File
SDMENCLength
FileLength
Place
holder
data
Placeholder
data
File
Placeholder
Plain File
Plain File Data
Data
data
Data
Plain File Data
data
Data
Placeholder data
XXh, XXh, XXh, .. XXh
Plain File Data
41h, 42h, … 4Fh
Nlen =
XXh ..
XXh
XXh
XXh
SDMMAC
`
‘
http://www.nxp.com/index.html?p=”
Offset + 16
XXh .. XXh
“x”
“x”
“&c=”
20h, 21h, … 2Fh
XXh .. XXh
`
‘
&m=”
SDMMACInputOffset
|| “&c= | | “E(SesSDMFileReadENCKey, 20h, 21h, 22h, … 2Dh, 2Eh, 2Fh)
|| “&m= )
Dynamic File Output
VCUID-
Offset
+ 14
SDMRead-
CtrOffset
+ 6
TTStatus
TTStatus Offset
SDMMACOffset
SDMENCOffset
SDMRead-
CtrOffset
Plain Plain
File
VCUIDOffset
Offset
+ 2
+
SDMMACOffset
+ 16
SDMENCOffset
SDMENCLength
FileLength
Plain Place
Plain UID
(ASCII)
File SDMReadCtr
File
holder Plain
File
Encrypted File Data
(ASCII encoded)
Plain File
Data
Computed MAC
(ASCII encoded)
Plain File Data
Plain File Data
Data
(ASCII)
Data
data
Data
(typically not read out)
41h, 42h, … 4Fh
Nlen =
“04E134FE9
D7CD3
43h
43h
“E(SesSDMFileReadENCKey,
20h, 21h, 22h, … 2Dh, 2Eh, 2Fh)
SDMMAC
`
‘
http://www.nxp.com/index.html?p=”
Offset + 16
“x”
“000001”
“x”
“&c=”
`
‘
&m=”
“MACt
SDMMACInputOffset
NLen
aaa-032484
Figure 12.ꢀSecure Dynamic Messaging for Reading example
10 Tag
Tamper Protection
NT4H2421Tx offers an NFC Forum-compliant solution to reflect e.g. if the sealing of
a product is opened. This solution works without a dedicated application on a mobile
NT4H2421Tx contains four pads, where two are used for antenna connection and the
of the first command that is sent after ISO/IEC 14443-4 activation, the IC checks the tag
tamper wire. If opened, this status will be recorded as permanent status in NVM. The
result can be reflected in the NDEF message. Next to this, NT4H2421Tx also supports
a specific command that triggers a measurement and returns both the permanent and
current status. This chapter describes how the feature is enabled, when the check is
executed and how the status can be retrieved.
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Figure 13.ꢀTag Tamper illustration
10.1 Enabling
the Tag Tamper feature
At delivery, NT4H2421Tx has the tag tamper feature disabled. The feature can be
command.
Section 10.3.2
. Enabling the Tag Tamper feature is permanent, it cannot be disabled
once enabled.
10.2 Tag
Tamper measurements
NT4H2421Tx maintains a permanent Tag Tamper status TTPermStatus. The
TTPermStatus and the current status TTCurrStatus can be mirrored together in the
•
Close
: 43h, i.e. ASCII encoding of ‘C’. This is the initial value when the seal is still
closed.
•
Open
: 4Fh, i.e. ASCII encoding of ‘O’. This is the value when the seal was opened.
•
Invalid
: 49h, i.e. ASCII encoding of ‘I’. This is the value when the feature has not been
enabled yet and no measurements are executed.
Once the feature has been enabled, NT4H2421Tx measures whether the seal is opened
by applying a measurement on the detection wire. As the NTAG 424 DNA TT is a
passive tag, it cannot trigger measurements itself. The measurement will be done, each
time the tag is powered and booted. If the current TTPermStatus is still set to Close, the
measurement will only be done after complete ISO/IEC 14443-4 activation and during
processing of the first command.
If a measurement detects the seal to be opened, the TTPermStatus is updated to
Open. Once set to Open, the measurement on boot will not be triggered anymore. The
TTPermStatus cannot be reset to Close anymore.
The following commands also trigger a measurement once the feature is enabled:
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10.3 Tag
Tamper status retrieval
10.3.1 Mirroring
in the NDEF message
The TTPermStatus and the TTCurrStatus can be mirrored within the NDEF messaging.
In this way, the status can be protected by the Secure Dynamic Messaging, as defined
10.3.2 GetTTStatus
command
Tamper Status: TTPermStatus and TTCurrStatus. For the latter, once the feature has
detected as open, the TTPermStatus will be updated to Open.
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11 Command
set
11.1 Introduction
This section contains the full command set of NTAG 424 DNA TT.
Remark
: In the figures and tables, always CommMode.Plain is presented and the field
length is valid for the plain data length. For the CommMode.MAC and CommMode.Full,
then data field needs to fill with the cryptogram (Plain; CMAC; encrypted data with
CMAC). Communication mode and condition are mentioned in the command description.
11.2 Supported
commands and APDUs
Table 22.ꢀAPDUs
Command
C-APDU (hex)
R-APDU (hex)
Communication mode
Data SW1SW2
INS
CLA INS
P1
P2
Lc
Data
Le
Succ
essful
AuthenticateEV2First
– Part1
AuthenticateEV2First
– Part2
90
90
90
71
AF
77
00
00
00
00
00
00
XX
20
Data
Data
Data
00
00
00
Data
Data
Data
91AF
9100
91AF
N/A (command specific)
N/A (command specific)
Part1
XX
Part2
90
AF
00
00
20
Data
00
Data
9100
AuthenticateLRPFirst
– Part1
AuthenticateLRPFirst
– Part2
90
90
90
71
AF
77
00
00
00
00
00
00
XX
20
Data
Data
Data
00
00
00
Data
Data
Data
91AF
9100
91AF
N/A (command specific)
N/A (command specific)
Part1
XX
Part2
90
AF
00
00
20
Data
00
Data
9100
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
00
90
90
00
90
5F
C4
51
F6
F5
64
F7
60
AF
AF
B0
AD
3C
A4
5C
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
XX
00
00
XX
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
XX
00
00
XX
XX
–
Data
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
XX
00
00
XX
00
–
9100
9100
9100
9100
9100
9100
9100
91AF
91AF
9100
9000
9100
9100
9000
9100
CommMode.Full
CommMode.Full
CommMode.Full
CommMode.Full
CommMode.MAC
CommMode.MAC
CommMode.Full
CommMode.MAC
CommMode.MAC
CommMode.Plain
Comm. mode of targeted file
CommMode.Full
CommMode.Plain
CommMode.Full
Data
–
–
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
FCI
–
File ID
01
01
–
File number
Key number
–
GetVersion
– Part1
GetVersion
– Part2
GetVersion
– Part3
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
XX
01
Reference
00
XX XX Data
to send
00 XX
Data
–
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Command
C-APDU (hex)
R-APDU (hex)
Communication mode
00
90
D6
8D
XX
00
XX XX Data
to write
–
–
–
9000
9100
CommMode.Plain
00
XX
Data
00
Comm. mode of targeted file
[1] MAC
on command and returned with the last response, calculated over all 3 responses
11.3 Status
word
Table 23.ꢀSW1 SW2 for CLA byte 0x90
SW1 SW2
0x9100
0x911C
0x911E
0x9140
0x917E
0x919D
0x919E
0x91AD
0x91AE
0x91AF
0x91BE
Name
OPERATION_OK
Description
Successful operation.
Command code not supported.
ILLEGAL_COMMAND_CODE
INTEGRITY_ERROR
CRC or MAC does not match data. Padding bytes not valid.
Invalid key number specified.
NO_SUCH_KEY
LENGTH_ERROR
Length of command string invalid.
PERMISSION_DENIED
PARAMETER_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_DELAY
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
ADDITIONAL_FRAME
BOUNDARY_ERROR
Current configuration / status does not allow the re- quested command.
Value of the parameter(s) invalid.
Currently not allowed to authenticate. Keep trying until full delay is spent.
Current authentication status does not allow the re- quested command.
Additionaldata frame is expected to be sent.
Attempt toread/write data from/to beyond the file’s/record’s limits.
Attempt to exceed the limits of a value file.
0x91CA
0x91F0
COMMAND_ABORTED
FILE_NOT_FOUND
Previous Command was not fully completed. Not all Frames were
requested or provided by the PCD.
Specified file number does not exist.
Table 24.ꢀ SW1 SW2 for CLA byte 0x00
SW1 SW2
Description
0x6700
0x6982
0x6985
0x6A80
0x6A82
0x6A86
0x6A87
0x6C00
0x6CXX
0x6D00
0x6E00
0x9000
Wrong length; no further indication
Security status not satisfied
Conditions of use not satisfied
Incorrect parameters in the command data field
File or application not found
Incorrect parameters P1-P2
Lc inconsistent with parameters P1-P2
Wrong Le field
Wrong Le field; SW2 encodes the exact number of avail- able data bytes.
Instruction code not supported or invalid
Class not supported
Normal processing (no further qualification)
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11.4 Authentication
commands
Authentication with the defined key is required to access the protected file according to
access rights. Based on successful authentication session keys are generated, which are
used for secure messaging between the terminal and NT4H2421Tx.
Remark:
Default FWI settings for authentication and secure messaging are set according
to GSMA specification v2.0 to the value 7h. This value is stored in the User ATS.
11.4.1 AuthenticateEV2First
This command initiates an authentication based on standard AES. After this
authentication, AES secure messaging is applied. This authentication command is
used to authenticate for the first time in a transaction and can always be used within
challenge-response-based mutual authentication command is completed in two parts:
1st Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
[1…6]
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 71 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
LenCap
KeyNo
PCDcap2
PCD to PICC
16
1
1
status
Response data
E(Kx, RndB)
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
2nd Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
32
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
P2
00
Lc
20
Le
00
PCD to PICC
E(Kx, RndA || RndB’)
32
1
1
status
Response data
PICC to PCD
E(Kx, TI || RndA’ || PDcap2 || PCDcap2)
SW1 SW2
aaa-032196
Figure 14.ꢀ AuthenticateEV2First command protocol
Table 25.ꢀ Command parameters description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
CMD
1
71h
Command code.
Targeted authentication key
RFU
KeyNo
1
Bit 7-6
Bit 5-0
1
00b
0h to 4h
00h to 06h
Key number
LenCap
Length of the PCD Capabilities.
[This value should be set to 00h].
PCDcap2.1
[1]
–
Capability vector of the PCD.
RFU, can hold any value
EV2 secure messaging
Bit 7-2
Bit 1
Bit 0
Full range
0b
Full range
Full range
RFU, can hold any value
PCDcap2.2-6 [1..5]
Capability vector of the PCD.
All other bytes but PCDcap2.1 are optional,
RFU and can hold any value.
[If LenCap set to 00h, no PCDcap2 present]
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Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 26.ꢀ Response data parameters description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
E(Kx, RndB)
16
Full range
Encrypted PICC challenge
The following data, encrypted with the key Kx
referenced by KeyNo:
– RndB: 16 byte random from PICC
SW1SW2
2
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
Table 27.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part1
Status
Value
CAh
7Eh
9Eh
40h
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
NO_SUCH_KEY
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
Targeted key does not exist
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
Targeted key not available for authentication.
Targeted key not enabled.
Targeting EV2 authentication and secure messaging,
while not allowed by configuration (PDCap2.1.Bit1 is
’1’).
AUTHENTICATION_DELAY
ADh
Currently not allowed to authenticate. Keep trying until
full delay is spent.
Table 28.ꢀ Command parameters description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
CMD
1
AFh
Additional frame
E(Kx, RndA ||
32
RndB’)
Full range
Encrypted PCD challenge and response
The following data, encrypted with the key Kx
referenced by KeyNo:
– RndA: 16 byte random from PCD.
– RndB’: 16 byte RndB rotated left by 1 byte
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Table 29.ꢀ Response data parameters description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
E(Kx, TI
32
Full range
Encrypted PICC response
|| RndA’ ||
PDcap2 ||
PCDcap2)
The following data encrypted with the key
referenced by KeyNo:
– TI: 4 byte Transaction Identifier
– RndA’: 16 byte RndA rotated left by 1 byte.
– PDcap2: 6 byte PD capabilities
– PCDcap2: 6 byte PCD capabilities
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 30.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateEV2First – Part2
Status
Value
7Eh
Description
LENGTH_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Command size not allowed.
Wrong RndB’
AEh
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.4.2 AuthenticateEV2NonFirst
The AuthenticateEV2NonFirst command can be used only if there is a valid
authentication with AuthenticateEV2First. It continues the transaction with the transaction
of transaction and sessions within the transaction have been designed to protect any
possible sophisticated replay attacks
1st Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 77 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Le
00
PCD to PICC
16
KeyNo
1
1
status
Response data
E(Kx, RndB)
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
2nd Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
32
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
P2
00
Lc
20
Le
00
PCD to PICC
32
E(Kx, RndA || RndB’)
1
1
status
Response data
E(Kx, RndA’)
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032197
Figure 15.ꢀ AuthenticateEV2NonFirst command protocol
Table 31.ꢀ Command parameters description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
CMD
1
77h
Command code.
Targeted authentication key
RFU
KeyNo
1
Bit 7-6
Bit 5-0
0
0h to 04h
Key number
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 32.ꢀ Response data parameters description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
E(Kx, RndB)
16
Full range
Encrypted PICC challenge
The following data, encrypted with the key Kx
referenced by KeyNo:
– RndB (16 byte): Random number from the
PICC.
SW1SW2
2
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
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Table 33.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part1
Status
Value
CAh
7Eh
9Eh
40h
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
NO_SUCH_KEY
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
Targeted key does not exist
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
In not authenticated state and not targeting
Targeted key not available for authentication.
Targeted key not enabled.
AUTHENTICATION_DELAY
MEMORY_ERROR
ADh
EEh
Currently not allowed to authenticate. Keep trying until
full delay is spent.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
Table 34.ꢀ Command parameters description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
CMD
1
AFh
Additional frame
E(Kx, RndA ||
32
RndB’)
Full range
Encrypted PCD challenge and response
The following data, encrypted with the key Kx
referenced by KeyNo:
– RndA: 16 byte random from PCD.
– RndB’: 16 byte RndB rotated left over 1 byte.
Table 35.ꢀ Response data parameters description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
E(Kx, RndA’)
16
Full range
Encrypted PICC challenge and response
The following data, encrypted with the key Kx
referenced by KeyNo:
– RndA: 16 byte random from PCD.
– RndB’: 16 byte RndB rotated left over 1 byte.
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 36.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateEV2NonFirst – Part2
Status
Value
7Eh
Description
LENGTH_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Command size not allowed.
Wrong RndB’
AEh
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.4.3 AuthenticateLRPFirst
Authentication for LRP secure messaging. The AuthenticationLRPFirst is intended to be
the first in a transaction and recommended. LRP secure messaging allows side-channel
resistant implementations.
1st Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 71 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Le
00
KeyNo
PCD to PICC
PICC to PCD
1
16
1
1
status
Auth
Mode
Response data
RndB
SW1 SW2
2nd Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
16
RndA
16
PCDResponse
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
P2
00
Lc
20
Le
00
PCD to PICC
16
16
PICCResponse
1
1
Data
status
PICC to PCD
PICCData
SW1 SW2
aaa-032199
Figure 16.ꢀ AuthenticateLRPFirst command protocol
Table 37.ꢀCommand parameters description – AuthenticateLRPFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
CMD
1
71h
Command code.
KeyNo
1
Targeted authentication key
RFU
Bit 7-6
Bit 5-0
1
00b
0h..4h
1h..6h
–
Key number
LenCap
Length of the PCD Capabilities.
Capability vector of the PCD.
RFU, can hold any value
LRP secure messaging
RFU, can hold any value
Capability vector of the PCD.
PCDcap2.1
1
Bit 7-2
Bit 1
Bit 0
Full range
1b
Full range
Full range
PCDcap2.2-6 [1..5]
All other bytes but PCDcap2.1 are optional,
RFU and can hold any value.
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 38.ꢀResponse data parameters description – AuthenticateLRPFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
01h
Description
AuthMode
RndB
1
LRP Mode
16
Full range
PICC challenge
RndB
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Name
Length
Value
Description
SW1SW2
2
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
Table 39.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateLRPFirst – Part1
Status
Value
CAh
7Eh
9Eh
40h
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
NO_SUCH_KEY
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
Targeted key does not exist.
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
Targeted key is locked as related TotFailCtr is equal to
or bigger than the TotFailCtrLimit.
AUTHENTICATION_DELAY
MEMORY_ERROR
ADh
EEh
Currently not allowed to authenticate. Keep trying until
full delay is spent.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
Table 40.ꢀCommand parameters description – AuthenticateLRPFirst – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
CMD
1
AFh
Additional frame
PCD challenge
RndA
16
16
Full range
Full range
PCDResponse
PCD response
MAC
LRP
(SesAuthMACKey;RndA || RndB)
Table 41.ꢀResponse data parameters description – AuthenticateLRPFirst – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
PICCData
16
Full range
Encrypted PICC data,
E
LRP
(SesAuthENCKey; TI; PDCap2;
PCDCap2)
PICCRespons 16
e
Full range
PICC response to the challenge
MAC
LRP
(SesAuthMACKey; RndB || RndA ||
PICCData)
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 42.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateLRPFirstPart2
Status
Value
7Eh
Description
LENGTH_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Command size not allowed.
Wrong PCDResp
AEh
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.4.4 AuthenticateLRPNonFirst
Consecutive authentication for LRP secure messaging. After this authentication,
LRP secure messaging is used. This authentication is intended to be the following
authentication in a transaction.
1st Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
[1…6]
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 71 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
KeyNo LenCap
PCDcap2
PCD to PICC
1
16
1
1
status
Auth
Mode
Response data
RndB
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
2nd Part
1
1
1
1
1
1
16
16
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
P2
00
Lc
20
Le
00
PCD to PICC
32
RndA
PCDResponse
1
1
status
Response data
PICC to PCD
PICCResponse
SW1 SW2
aaa-032198
Figure 17.ꢀ AuthenticationLRPNonFirst command protocol
Table 43.ꢀCommand parameters description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
CMD
1
71h
Command code.
Targeted authentication key
RFU
KeyNo
1
Bit 7-6
Bit 5-0
00b
00h to 04h
Key Number
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 44.ꢀResponse data parameters description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part1
Name
Length
Value
01h
Description
LRP
AuthMode
RndB
1
16
2
Full range
PICC random RndB
SW1SW2
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
Table 45.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part1
Status
Value
CAh
7Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Command size not allowed.
9Eh
Parameter value not allowed.
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Status
Value
40h
Description
NO_SUCH_KEY
Targeted key does not exist
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
In not authenticated state and not targeting
Targeted key not available for authentication.
Targeted key not enabled.
AUTHENTICATION_DELAY
MEMORY_ERROR
ADh
EEh
Currently not allowed to authenticate.
Keep trying until full delay is spent.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
Table 46.ꢀ Command parameters description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part2
Name
CMD
RndA
Length
Value
Description
1
AFh
Additional frame
16
Full range
PCD challenge
RndA
PCDResp
16
Full range
PCD response to the challenge
MAC
LRP
(SesAuthMACKey;RndA || RndB)
Table 47.ꢀResponse data parameters description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part2
Name
Length
Value
Description
PICCResp
16
Full range
PICC response to the challenge
MAC
LRP
(SesAuthMACKey;RndB || RndA)
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 48.ꢀ Return code description – AuthenticateLRPNonFirst – Part2
Status
Value
7Eh
Description
LENGTH_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Command size not allowed.
Wrong PCDResp
AEh
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.5 Memory
and configuration commands
11.5.1 SetConfiguration
With the SetConfiguration command, the application attributes can be configured. It
The command consists of an option byte and a data field with a size depending on the
option. The option byte specifies the nature of the data field content.
In the below table “No change” references are used with configurations that are
persistent. This means that the associated configuration is left as it is already in the card
and its value is not changed.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
up to 40 bytes
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 5C 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
PCD to PICC
0
Option
Data Parameters
1
1
status
Response data
–
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032200
Figure 18.ꢀ SetConfiguration command protocol
Table 49.ꢀCommand parameters description – SetConfiguration
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
1
5Ch
–
Command code.
Option
Configuration Option. It defines the length and
content of the Data parameter. The Option byte
is transmitted in plain text, whereas the Data is
always transmitted in CommMode.Full.
00h
PICC configuration.
04h
Secure Messaging Configuration.
Capability data.
05h
07h
Tag Tamper Configuration
Failed authentication counter setting
HW configuration
0Ah
0Bh
Other values
RFU
Command Data Parameters
Data Up
to 10 bytes
–
Data content depends on option values.
Full range
Data content depends on option value as
defined in setConfigOptionsList Table.
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Table 50.ꢀ SetConfigOptionList
Option
Data
Length
Field
Length/bitin Description
dex
00h
1 byte
PICC Configuration
PICCConfig
Bit 7-2
Bit 1
RFU
UseRID configuration for Random.
Random ID is disabled at delivery
time.
1b: Enable Random UID
0b: No change
Bit 0
RFU
04h
2 bytes
Secure Messaging Configuration
SMConfig
Bit 15 to 3
Bit 2
RFU
Secure messaging configuration
for StandardData file
0b: No Change
1b: disable chained writing with
WriteData
command in CommMod
e.MAC and CommMode.Full
Bit 1-0
RFU
05h
10 bytes
Capability data, consisting of PDCap2
4 bytes
1 byte
RFU
User configured PDCap2.1
Bit 7 to 2: RFU
Bit 1: 1b means enable LRP
mode. This change is permanent,
LRP mode cannot be disabled
afterwards.
Bit 1: 0b means no change
3 bytes
1 byte
1 byte
RFU
User configured PDCap2.5
User configured PDCap2.6
07h
2 bytes
Tag Tamper Configuration
TTConfig
1 byte
Bit 7 to 1: RFU
Bit 0: 1b Enabling Tag Tamper
Bit 0: 0b means no change
1 byte
00h .. 04h: targeted key will be
required for GetTTStatus
0Eh: free access to GetTTStatus
(default)
0Fh: no access to GetTTStatus
0Ah
5 bytes
Failed authentication counter configuration
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Option
Data
Length
Field
Length/bitin Description
dex
FailedCtrOption
1 byte
Bit 7 to 1: RFU
Bit 0: Set to 0b for disabling
Bit 0: Set to 1b for enabling
[default]
TotFailCtrLimit
TotFailCtrDecr
2 bytes
configurable limit, encoded as
2-byte unsigned integer (LSB
first), must be bigger than 0000h.
Default value: 1000. When
disabling, this value is ignored
2 bytes
configurable decrement value,
encoded as 2-byte unsigned
integer (LSB first). Default value:
10. When disabling, this value is
ignored.
0Bh
1 byte
HW configuration
HW Option
1 byte
Bit 7 to 1: RFU
Bit 0: Set to 0b for Standard back
modulation
Bit 0: Set to 1b for Strong back
[1] note
that it is strongly recommended to leave the default setting, specifically for antennas smaller than Class1
Table 51.ꢀResponse data parameters description – SetConfiguration
Name
Length
Value
Description
Response
data
0
–
No response data
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 52.ꢀReturn code description – SetConfiguration
Status
Value Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
CAh
1Eh
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid cryptogram (padding or CRC). Invalid secure
messaging MAC.
LENGTH_ERROR
7Eh
Command size not allowed.
Option 00h: Data length is not 1
Option 04h: Data length is not 2
Option 05h: Data length is not 10
Option 07h: Data length is not 2
Option 0Ah: Data length is not 5
Option 0Bh: Data length is not 1
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Status
Value Description
PARAMETER_ERROR
9Eh
Parameter value not allowed.
Option 00h: Data bit 7-2 or bit 0 not set to 0b.
Option 07h: targeting non-existing key
Unsupported option (i.e. Reserved).
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
Option 00h, 04h, 05h, 07h, 0Ah, 0Bh: not supported /
allowed at PICC level
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR AEh
MEMORY_ERROR EEh
Option 00h, 04h, 05h, 07h, 0Ah, 0Bh: No active
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.5.2 GetVersion
The GetVersion command returns manufacturing related data of NTAG 424 DNA TT
(NT4H2421Tx). No parameters are required for this command.
Remark:
This command is only available after ISO/IEC 14443-4 activation.
The version data is return over three frames. Part1 returns the hardware-related
information, Part2 returns the software-related information and Part3 and last frame
returns the production-related information. This command is freely accessible without
secure messaging as soon as the PD is selected and there is no active authentication.
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
90 60 00
P2
00
Lc
–
Le
00
PCD to PICC
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
status
PICC to PCD
VendorID HW
T
ype HWSubType HWMajorVersion HWMinorVersion HWStorageSize HWProtocol
SW1 SW2
0
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
1
1
1
1
1
Data
–
P2
00
Lc
–
Le
00
PCD to PICC
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
status
PICC to PCD
VendorID SWType SWSubType SWMajorVersion SWMinorVersion SWStorageSize SWProtocol
SW1 SW2
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 AF 00
1
1
1
1
0
1
Data
–
P2
00
Lc
–
Le
00
PCD to PICC
1
1
7
4
1
1
1
[1]
status
SW1 SW2
aaa-032201
PICC to PCD
UID
BatchNo
BatchNo/FabKey
FabKey/CWProd
YearProd
FabKeyID
Figure 19.ꢀGetVersion command protocol
Part 1
Table 53.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetVersion – Part1
Name
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
Command Data Parameters
Length
Value
60h
–
Description
1
Command code.
No data parameters
–
–
Table 54.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetVersion – Part1
Name
Length
Value
04h
04h
–
Description
VendorID
HWType
HWSubType
1
1
1
Vendor ID
HW type for NTAG
HW subtype
X8h
0Xh
8Xh
30h
50 pF + Tag Tamper
Strong back modulation
Standard back modulation
HW major version number
HWMajorVersion
1
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Name
Length
Value
00h
–
Description
HWMinorVersion
1
1
HW minor version number
HW storage size
256 B<storage size< 512 B
RFU
HWStorageSize
11h
other
values
HWProtocol
SW1SW2
1
2
05h
HW communication protocol type
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
Part 2
Table 55.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetVersion – Part2
Name
CMD
Data
Length
Value
AFh
–
Description
1
0
Additional frame request.
No data parameters:
Table 56.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetVersion – Part2
Name
Length
Value
04h
04h
02h
01h
02h
–
Description
VendorID
1
1
1
1
1
1
Vendor ID
SWType
SW type for NTAG
SW subtype
SWSubType
SWMajorVersion
SWMinorVersion
SWStorageSize
SW major version number
SW minor version number
SW storage size
256 B<storage size< 512 B
RFU
11h
other
values
SWProtocol
SW1SW2
1
2
05h
SW communication protocol type
91AFh
91XXh
successful execution
Part 3
Table 57.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetVersion – Part3
Name
CMD
Data
Length
Value
AFh
–
Description
1
0
Additional frame request.
No data parameters:
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Table 58.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetVersion – Part3
Name
Length
Value
–
Description
UID
7
UID
All zero
if configured for RandomID
Full range
UID if not configured for RandomID
Full range
Production batch number
BatchNo
4
BatchNo/FabKey
1
Bit 7-4
Bit 3-0
1
Full range
Production batch number
0h
Default FabKey, other values RFU
FabKey/CWProd
Bit 7
Bit 6-0
1
0b
Default FabKey, other values RFU
Calendar week of production
01h..52h
YearProd
FabKeyID
Full range
Year of production
[1]
1Fh..FFh Optional,
present for customized configurations
when FabKey = 1Fh
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 59.ꢀ Return code description – GetVersion
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC (only).
Command size not allowed.
7Eh
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.5.3 GetCardUID
GetCardUID command is required to get the 7-byte UID from the card. In case “Random
ID” at activation is configured, encrypted secure messaging is applied for this command
and response. An authentication with any key needs to be performed prior to the
command GetCardUID. This command returns the UID and gives the opportunity to
retrieve the UID, even if the Random ID is used.
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
90 51 00
P2
00
Lc
–
Le
00
PCD to PICC
7
1
1
status
Response data
UID
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032202
Figure 20.ꢀGetCardUID command protocol
Table 60.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetCardUID
Name
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
Command Data Parameters
Length
Value
51h
–
Description
1
Command code.
–
–
No data parameters
Table 61.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetCardUID
Name
UID
Length
Value
Description
7
2
Full range
UID of the NT4H2421Tx
SW1SW2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 62.ꢀ Return code description – GetCardUID
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC (only).
Command size not allowed.
7Eh
AEh
EEh
No active authentication
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.6 Key
management commands
NT4H2421Tx provides the following command set for Key Management.
11.6.1 ChangeKey
The ChangeKey command is used to change the application keys. Authentication with
application key number 0 is required to change the key. CommMode.Full is applied for
this command. Note that the cryptogram calculations for changing key number 0 and
other keys are different.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17 or 21
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 C4 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
PCD to PICC
KeyNo
KeyData
0
1
1
status
Response data
–
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032203
Figure 21.ꢀ ChangeKey command protocol
Table 63.ꢀ Command parameters description – ChangeKey
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
C4h
–
Command code.
KeyNo
1
Key number of the key to be changed.
RFU
Bit 7-6
Bit 5-0
00b
Key Number
0h..4h
The application key number
Command Data Parameters
KeyData 17
or 21
New key data.
full range
if key 0 is to be changed
NewKey || KeyVer
(17-byte
length)
full range
if key 1 to 4 are to be changed
(21-byte
length)
(NewKey XOR OldKey) || KeyVer ||
[1] The
CRC32NK is the 4-byte CRC value computed according to IEEE Std 802.3-2008 (FCS Field) over NewKey
[9]
Table 64.ꢀ Response data parameters description – ChangeKey
Name
Length
Value
Description
Response data
SW1SW2
0
2
–
No response data
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
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Table 65.ꢀ Return code description – ChangeKey
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Integrity error in cryptogram or invalid secure
messaging MAC ( Secure Messaging).
LENGTH_ERROR
7Eh
9Eh
40h
9Dh
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
Targeted key does not exist
PARAMETER_ERROR
NO_SUCH_KEY
PERMISSION_DENIED
cannot be changed
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
AEh
EEh
At application level, missing active authentication with
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.6.2 GetKeyVersion
The GetKeyVersion command retrieves the current key version of any key. Key version
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 64 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Le
00
KeyNo
PCD to PICC
1
1
1
status
Response data
KeyVer
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032204
Figure 22.ꢀ GetKeyVersion command protocol
Table 66.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetKeyVersion
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
64h
Command code.
KeyNo
1
–
Key number of the targeted key
RFU
Bit 7-4
3 to 0
00h
00h to 04h
Application key number
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 67.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetKeyVersion
Name
Length
Value
–
Description
KeyVer
1
Key version of the targeted key
[if targeting disabled keys]
[else]
00h
00h
Full range
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 68.ꢀ Return code description – GetKeyVersion
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
7Eh
9Eh
40h
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
NO_SUCH_KEY
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC (only).
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
Targeted key does not exist.
MEMORY_ERROR
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.7 File
management commands
The NT4H2421Tx provides the following command set for File Management functions.
11.7.1 ChangeFileSettings
The ChangeFileSettings command changes the access parameters of an existing file.
The communication mode can be either CommMode.Plain or CommMode.Full based on
current access right of the file.
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 5F 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
FileNo FileOption AccessRights [SDMOptions SMDAccessRights UIDOffset SDMReadCtrOffset PICCDataOffset
TTStatusOffset SDMMACInputOFFset SDMENCOffset SDMENCLength SDMMACOffset SDMReadCtrLimit]
PCD to PICC
0
1
1
status
Response data
–
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032577
Figure 23.ꢀ ChangeFileSettings command protocol
Table 69.ꢀ Command parameters description – ChangeFileSettings
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
5Fh
–
Command code.
FileNo
1
File number of the targeted file.
Bit 7-5
Bit 4-0
RFU
File number
Command Data Parameters
FileOption
1
–
Options for the targeted file.
RFU
Bit 7
Bit 6
0b
Secure Dynamic Messaging and
Mirroring
0b
disabled
enabled
RFU
1b
Bit 5-2
Bit 1-0
0000b
AccessRights
SDMOptions
2
–
–
Set of access conditions for the first
[1]
[Optional, present if FileOption[Bit
6] set]
SDM Options
UID (only for mirroring)
disabled
Bit 7
Bit 6
–
0b
1b
–
enabled
SDMReadCtr
disabled
0b
1b
enabled
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Name
Length
Value
–
Description
SDMReadCtrLimit
disabled
Bit 5
0b
1b
–
enabled
Bit 4
Bit 3
SDMENCFileData
disabled
0b
1b
–
enabled
TTStatus
0b
1b
00b
–
disabled
enabled
Bit 2-1
Bit 0
RFU
Encoding mode
ASCII
1b
–
SDMAccessRights
[2]
[Optional, present if FileOption[Bit
6] set]
SDM Access Rights
Bit 15- 12
–
SDMMetaRead access right
0h..4h
Encrypted PICCData mirroring
Eh
Plain PICCData mirroring
No PICCData mirroring
SDMFileRead access right
No SDM for Reading
RFU
Fh
Bit 11- 8
–
0h..4h
Fh
Bit 7-4
Bit 3-0
Fh
–
SDMCtrRet access right
Free
0h..4h
Eh
Fh
No Access
UIDOffset
[3]
[3]
–
[Optional, present if
((SDMOptions[Bit 7] = 1b) AND
(SDMMetaRead access right = Eh)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for UID
0h .. (FileSize –
UIDLength)
Offset within the file
SDMReadCtrOffset
–
[Optional, present if
((SDMOptions[Bit 6] = 1b) AND
(SDMMetaRead access right = Eh)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for
SDMReadCtr
0h .. (FileSize –
Offset within the file
SDMReadCtrLength)
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Name
Length
Value
Description
FFFFFFh
–
No SDMReadCtr mirroring
PICCDataOffset
[3]
[Optional, present if SDMMetaRead
access right =0h..4h]
Mirror position (LSB first) for
encrypted PICCData
0h .. (FileSize –
Offset within the file
PICCDataLength)
TTStatusOffset
[3]
[3]
[3]
–
[Optional, present if
(SDMOptions[Bit 3] = 1b)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for
TTStatus
0h .. (FileSize-2)
–
Offset within the file
SDMMACInputOffset
SDMENCOffset
[Optional, present if SDMFileRead
access right != Fh]
Offset in the file where the SDM
MAC computation starts (LSB first)
0h .. (SDMMACOffset)
Offset within the file
–
[Optional, present if ((SDMFileRead
access right != Fh) AND
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 1b))]
SDMENCFileData mirror position
(LSB first)
SDMMACInputOffset ..
Offset within the file
(SDMMACOffset – 32)
SDMENCLength
[3]
[3]
–
[Optional, present if ((SDMFileRead
access right != Fh) AND
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 1b))]
Length of the SDMENCFileData
(LSB first)
32 .. (SDMMACOffset –
Offset within the file, must be
SDMENCOffset)
multiple of 32
SDMMACOffset
–
[Optional, present if SDMFileRead
access right != Fh]
SDMMAC mirror position (LSB first)
SDMMACInputOffset ..
[if (SDMFileRead access right !=
(FileSize – 16)
Fh) AND (SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 0b)]
Offset within the file
(SDMENCOffset +
SDMENCLength) ..
(FileSize- 16)
[if (SDMFileRead access right !=
Fh) AND (SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 1b)]
Offset within the file
SDMReadCtrLimit
[3]
Full range
[Optional, present if
SDMOptions[Bit 5] = 1b]
SDMReadCtrLimit value (LSB first)
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Table 70.ꢀ Response data parameters description – ChangeFileSettings
Name
Length
Value
Description
Response
data
0
–
No response data
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 71.ꢀ Return code description – ChangeFileSettings
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Integrity error in cryptogram. Invalid Secure Messaging
MAC (only).
LENGTH_ERROR
7Eh
9Eh
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
PARAMETER_ERROR
Targeted key for one of the access conditions in
AccessRights or SDMAccessRights does not exist.
Trying to set access right SDMMetaRead to a value
different than Fh, while both UID and SDMReadCtr
mirroring are disabled.
Trying to set access right SDMMetaRead to Fh, while
enabling UID mirroring.
Trying to set access right SDMCtrRet to a value
different from Fh, while SDMReadCtr is disabled.
SDMMAC and UID mirroring are overlapping, i.e. the
following condition is not satisfied: (SDMMACOffset
≥ UIDOffset + UIDLength) OR (UIDOffset ≥
SDMMACOffset + SDMMACLength)
SDMMAC and SDMReadCtr mirroring are
overlapping, i.e. the following condition is not
satisfied: (SDMMACOffset ≥ SDMReadCtrOffset
+ SDMReadCtrLength) OR (SDMReadCtrOffset ≥
SDMMACOffset + SDMMACLength)
SDMMAC and PICCData mirroring are
overlapping, i.e. the following condition is not
satisfied: (SDMMACOffset ≥ PICCDataOffset
+ PICCDataLength) OR (PICCDataOffset ≥
SDMMACOffset + SDMMACLength)
SDMMAC and TTStatus mirroring are overlapping, i.e.
the following condition is not satisfied: (SDMMACOffset
≥ TTStatusOffset + 2) OR (TTStatusOffset ≥
SDMMACOffset + SDMMACLength)
SDMENCFileData and UID mirroring are overlapping,
i.e. the following condition is not satisfied:
(SDMENCOffset ≥ UIDOffset + UIDLength) OR
(UIDOffset ≥ SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength)
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Status
Value
Description
SDMENCFileData and SDMReadCtr mirroring
are overlapping, i.e. the following condition is not
satisfied: (SDMENCOffset ≥ SDMReadCtrOffset
+ SDMReadCtrLength) OR (SDMReadCtrOffset ≥
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength)
SDMENCFileData and PICCData mirroring are
overlapping, i.e. the following condition is not
satisfied: (SDMENCOffset ≥ PICCDataOffset
+ PICCDataLength) OR (PICCDataOffset ≥
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength)
TTStatus and UID mirroring are overlapping, i.e. the
following condition is not satisfied: (TTStatusOffset
≥ UIDOffset + UIDLength) OR (UIDOffset ≥
TTStatusOffset + 2
TTStatus and SDMReadCtr mirroring are
overlapping, i.e. the following condition is not
satisfied: (TTStatusOffset ≥ SDMReadCtrOffset +
SDMReadCtrLength) OR (SDMReadCtrOffset ≥
TTStatusOffset + 2)
TTStatus and PICCData mirroring are overlapping, i.e.
the following condition is not satisfied: (TTStatusOffset
≥ PICCDataOffset + PICCDataLength) OR
(PICCDataOffset ≥ TTStatusOffset + 2) (DFCMD.2495)
PARAMETER_ERROR
TTStatus is part of SDMENCFileData but not
part of the plaintext placeholder, i.e. following
condition is satisfied: (TTStatusOffset + 1 ≥
SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength/2) AND
((TTStatusOffset<SDMENCOffset + SDMENCLength)
UID and SDMReadCtr mirroring are overlapping, i.e.
the following condition is not satisfied: (UIDOffset
≥ SDMReadCtrOffset + SDMReadCtrLength) OR
(SDMReadCtrOffset ≥ UIDOffset + UIDLength)
Enabling Secure Dynamic Messaging encryption
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] set to 1b) is not possible if access
right SDMFileRead = Fh.
Enabling Secure Dynamic Messaging encryption
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] set to 1b) is not allowed if
not both SDMReadCtr and UID are mirrored (i.e.
SDMOptions[Bit 7] and SDMOptions[Bit 6] must be set
to 1b)
Trying to set a SDMReadCtrLimit while not enabling
SDMReadCtr.
Trying to set a SDMReadCtrLimit which is smaller or
equal to the current SDMReadCtr.
PERMISSION_DENIED
9Dh
PICC level (MF) is selected.
access right Change of targeted file has access
conditions set to Fh.
Enabling Secure Dynamic Messaging (FileOption Bit 6
set to 1b) is only allowed for FileNo 02h.
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Status
Value
Description
FILE_NOT_FOUND
F0h
File with targeted FileNo does not exist for the targeted
application.
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
AEh
EEh
File access right Change of targeted file not granted as
there is no active authentication with the required key
while the access conditions is different from Fh.
MEMORY_ERROR
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
11.7.2 GetFileSettings
The GetFileSettings command allows getting information on the properties of a specific
file. The information provided by this command depends on the type of the file which is
queried.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
CLA CMD
P1
90 F5 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Data
FileNo
Le
00
PCD to PICC
1
1
Response data
FileType FileOption AccessRights FileSize [SDMOptions SMDAccessRights UIDOffset SDMReadCtrOffset
PICCDataOffset TTStatusOffset SDMMACInputOffset SDMENCOffset SDMENCLengt
h
S
DMMACOffset SDMReadCtrlLimit]
status
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032580
Figure 24.ꢀ GetFileSettings command protocol
Table 72.ꢀCommand parameters description – GetFileSettings
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
F5h
–
Command code.
File number of the targeted file.
RFU
FileNo
1
Bit 7-5
Bit 4-0
File number
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
Table 73.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetFileSettings
Name
Length
Value
–
Description
FileType
1
File Type of the targeted file.
StandardData File
00h
Other values
RFU
FileOption
1
–
Options for the targeted file.
Bit 7
Bit 6
RFU
–
Secure Dynamic Messaging and
Mirroring
0b
disabled
enabled
RFU
1b
Bit 5-2
0000b
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Name
Length
Value
Description
Bit 1-0
AccessRights
2
–
Set of access conditions for the 1st set in
FileSize
3
–
–
File size of the targeted file.
SDMOptions
[1]
[Optional, present if FileOption[Bit 6] set]
SDMAccessRights
UIDOffset
[2]
[3]
–
–
[Optional, present if FileOption[Bit 6] set]
[Optional, present if ((SDMOptions[Bit 7]
= 1b) AND (SDMMetaRead access right
= Eh)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for UID, see
SDMReadCtrOffset
[3]
–
[Optional, present if ((SDMOptions[Bit 6]
= 1b) AND (SDMMetaRead access right
= Eh)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for
PICCDataOffset
TTStatusOffset
[3]
[3]
[3]
–
–
–
[Optional, present if SDMMetaRead
access right =0h..4h]
Mirror position (LSB first) for encrypted
[Optional, present if (SDMOptions[Bit 3]
= 1b)]
Mirror position (LSB first) for TTStatus,
SDMMACInputOffset
[Optional, present if SDMFileRead
access right != Fh]
Offset in the file where the SDM MAC
computation starts (LSB first), see
SDMENCOffset
SDMENCLength
SDMMACOffset
[3]
[3]
[3]
–
–
–
[Optional, present if ((SDMFileRead
access right != Fh) AND
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 1b))]
SDMENCFileData mirror position (LSB
[Optional, present if ((SDMFileRead
access right != Fh) AND
(SDMOptions[Bit 4] = 1b))]
Length of the SDMENCFileData (LSB
[Optional, present if SDMFileRead
access right != Fh]
SDMMAC mirror position (LSB first), see
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Name
Length
Value
Description
SDMReadCtrLimit
[3]
–
[Optional, present if SDMOptions[Bit 5] =
1b]
SDMReadCtrLimit value (LSB first), see
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 74.ꢀ Return code description – GetFileSettings
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
7Eh
9Eh
9Dh
F0h
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
PERMISSION_DENIED
FILE_NOT_FOUND
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC (only).
Command size not allowed.
Parameter value not allowed.
PICC level (MF) is selected.
File with targeted FileNo does not exist for the targeted
application.
MEMORY_ERROR
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
11.7.3 GetFileCounters
The GetFileCounters command supports retrieving of the current values associated
with the SDMReadCtr related with a StandardData file after enabling Secure Dynamic
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 F6 00
P2
00
Lc
xx
Le
00
PCD to PICC
FileNr
8
1
1
status
Response data
PICC to PCD
SDMReadCtr Reserved
SW1 SW2
aaa-032471
Figure 25.ꢀ GetFileCounters command protocol
Table 75.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetFileCounters
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
F6h
–
Command code.
File number of the targeted file.
RFU
FileNo
1
Bit 7-5
Bit 4-0
000b
Limited range
File number
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
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Table 76.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetFileCounters
Name
Length
Value
Description
SDMReadCtr
3
Full Range
Current SDMReadCtr of the targeted file (LSB
first).
Reserved
SW1SW2
2
2
0000h
RFU
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 77.ꢀ Return code description – GetFileCounters
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
PERMISSION_DENIED
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing
Invalid secure messaging MAC
Command size not allowed
7Eh
9Eh
Parameter value not allowed
PICC level (MF) is selected.
9Dh
Targeted file has no Secure Dynamic Messaging
enabled.
Targeted file has SDMCtrRet access right set to Fh.
Targeted file does not exist in the targeted application
FILE_NOT_FOUND
F0h
AEh
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
SDMCtrRet access right not granted while different
from Fh.
FILE_NOT_FOUND
MEMORY_ERROR
F0h
EEh
File with targeted FileNo does not exist for the targeted
application.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory
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11.8 Data
management commands
The NT4H2421Tx provides the following command set for Data Management functions.
11.8.1 ReadData
The ReadData command allows reading data from StandardData Files. The Read
command requires a preceding authentication either with the key specified for Read
on the communication mode settings of the file secure messaging is applied, see
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
CLA CMD
P1
90 AD 00
P2
00
Lc
07
Le
00
FileNo
Offset
Length
PCD to PICC
up to 256
1
1
status
Response data
–
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032211
Figure 26.ꢀ ReadData command protocol
Table 78.ꢀ Command parameters description – ReadData
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
ADh
–
Command code.
FileNo
1
File number of the targeted file.
Bit 7-5
Bit 4-0
000b
RFU
File number
Full Range
Offset
3
3
000000h ..
(FileSize – 1)
Starting position for the read operation.
Number of bytes to be read.
Length
–
000000h
Read the entire StandardData file, starting
from the position specified in the offset value.
Note that the short length Le limits response
data to 256 byte including secure messaging (if
applicable).
000001h ..
(FileSize –
Offset)
Command Data Parameters
–
–
–
No data parameters
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Table 79.ꢀ Response data parameters description – ReadData
Name
Length
Value
Description
Response
data
up to 256
byte including
secure
Full Range
Data read from the file
messaging
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 80.ꢀ Return code description – ReadData
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing
Invalid secure messaging MAC (only)
SMDRdCtr overflow
LENGTH_ERROR
7Eh
9Eh
9Dh
Command size not allowed
PARAMETER_ERROR
PERMISSION_DENIED
Parameter value not allowed
PICC level (MF) is selected.
Read, ReadWrite and SDMFileRead (if SDM is
enabled) access right of targeted StandardData file
only have access conditions set to Fh.
Targeted file cannot be read in not authenticated state
as the related SDMReadCtr is equal or bigger than its
SDMReadCtrLimit.
FILE_NOT_FOUND
F0h
AEh
Targeted file does not exist in the targeted application
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
Read, ReadWrite and SDMFileRead (if SDM enabled)
access right of targeted file not granted while at least
one of the access conditions is different from Fh.
MEMORY_ERROR
EEh
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory
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11.8.2 WriteData
The WriteData command allows writing data to StandardData Files. NT4H2421Tx
supports tearing protection for data that is sent within one communication frame to the
file. Consequently, when using ISO/IEC 14443-4 chaining to write to a StandardData file,
each frame itself is tearing protected but an interrupted chaining can lead to inconsistent
files. Using single-frame WriteData commands instead of using the chaining can enable
better control of the overall write process.
Depending on the communication mode settings of the Data file, data needs to be sent
with either CommMode.Plain, CommMode.MAC or CommMode.Full. All cryptographic
operations are done in CBC mode. In case of CommMode.MAC or CommMode.Full,
the validity of data is verified by the PICC by checking the MAC. If the verification fails,
the PICC stops further user memory programming and returns an Integrity Error to the
PCD. As a consequence of the Integrity Error, any transaction, which might have begun,
is automatically aborted. This can lead to the same situation as described above for an
interrupted WriteData using chained communication.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
up to 248
Data
CLA CMD
P1
90 8D 00
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
FileNo Offset Length
PCD to PICC
0
1
1
status
Response data
PICC to PCD
–
SW1 SW2
aaa-032212
Figure 27.ꢀWriteData command protocol
Table 81.ꢀ Command parameters description – WriteData
Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
1
8Dh
–
Command code.
FileNo
1
File number of the targeted file.
Bit 7-5
Bit 4-0
000b
RFU
File number
Full range
Offset
3
3
000000h ..
(FileSize – 1)
Starting position for the write operation.
Number of bytes to be written.
Length
000001h ..
(FileSize –
Offset)
Command Data Parameters
Data
up to 248
byte including
secure
Full range
Data to be written.
messaging
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Table 82.ꢀ Response data parameters description – WriteData
Name Length
Value Description
No response data parameters defined for this command
Response
data
0
–
No response data
SW1SW2
2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 83.ꢀ Return code description – WriteData
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
PARAMETER_ERROR
PERMISSION_DENIED
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC or encryption padding.
Command size not allowed.
7Eh
9Eh
Parameter value not allowed.
9Dh
PICC level (MF) is selected.
Write and ReadWrite of targeted file only have access
conditions set to Fh.
Targeting a StandardData file with a chained command
in MAC or Full while this is not allowed.
FILE_NOT_FOUND
F0h
AEh
Targeted file does not exist in the targeted application.
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
Write and ReadWrite of targeted file not granted while
at least one of the access conditions is different from
Fh.
BOUNDARY_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
BEh
EEh
Attempt to write beyond the file boundary as set during
creation.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
11.9 Tag
Tamper protection commands
11.9.1 GetTTStatus
The GetTTStatus command supports retrieving of the the permanent and current Tag
Tamper Status: TTPermStatus and TTCurrStatus. For the latter, once the feature has
If detected as open, the TTPermStatus will be updated to Open. Encrypted secure
messaging is applied for this command and response.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
90 F7 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Le
00
PCD to PICC
56
1
1
status
Response data
PICC to PCD
TTPermStatus TTCurStatus
SW1 SW2
aaa-032472
Figure 28.ꢀ GetTTStatus command protocol
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Table 84.ꢀ Command parameters description – GetTTStatus
Name
Command Header Parameters
Cmd
Command Data Parameters
Length
Value
F7h
–
Description
1
Command code.
No data parameters
–
–
Table 85.ꢀ Response data parameters description – GetTTStatus
Name
Length
Value
–
Description
TTPermStatus
Close
TTPermStatus
1
43h
4Fh
49h
–
Open
Invalid
TTCurrStatus
SW1SW2
1
2
TTCurrStatus
Close
43h
4Fh
49h
Open
Invalid
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 86.ꢀ Return code description – GetTTStatus
Status
Value
CAh
1Eh
Description
COMMAND_ABORTED
INTEGRITY_ERROR
LENGTH_ERROR
PERMISSION_DENIED
Chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Invalid secure messaging MAC
Command size not allowed.
7Eh
9Dh
PICC level (MF) is selected.
TTStatusKey
is configured for no access (0Fh).
AUTHENTICATION_ERROR
MEMORY_ERROR
AEh
EEh
different from 0Eh and 0Fh.
Failure when reading or writing to non-volatile memory.
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11.10 Inter-industry
standard commands
NT4H2421Tx provides the following ISO/IEC 7816-4 wrapped commands.
11.10.1 ISOSelectFile
This command is implemented in compliance with ISO/IEC 7816-4. It selects either the
PICC level, an application or a file within the application.
If P1 is set to 00h, 01h or 02h, selection is done by a 2-byte ISO file identifier. For PICC
level / MF selection, 3F00h or empty data has to be used. For Deticated application
File (DF) and Elementary File (EF) selection, data holds the 2-byte ISO/IEC 7816-4 file
identifier.
If P1 is set to 04h, selection is done by Deticated File (DF) name which can be up to 16
bytes. The registered ISO DF name is D2760000850100h. When selecting this DF name,
the PICC level (or MF) is selected. For selecting the application immediately, the ISO/IEC
7816-4 DF name D2760000850101h can be used.
P2 indicates whether or not File Control Information (FCI) is to be returned in case of
application selection. NT4H2421Tx does not support FCI and thus never returns any
data, but does support both selection options to achieve broadest compatibility. The
number of bytes requested by Le up to the complete file data will be returned in plain.
There is no specific FCI template format checked, i.e. the data stored in the file will be
sent back as is. In case of PICC level or file selection, FCI data is never returned. For
NT4H2421Tx, no FCI will be returned as the pre-installed application does not contain
such a file.
1
1
1
1
[1]
[1..16]
[1]
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
00 A4 04
P2
00
Lc
XX
Le
00
PCD to PICC
PICC to PCD
1
1
status
SW1 SW2
aaa-032226
Figure 29.ꢀISOSelectFile command protocol
Table 87.ꢀ Command parameters description – ISOSelectFile
Name
CLA
INS
Length
Value
00h
A4h
–
Description
1
1
1
P1
Selection Control
00h
01h
02h
03h
04h
–
Select MF, DF or EF, by file identifier
Select child DF
Select EF under the current DF, by file identifier
Select parent DF of the current DF
Option
P2
1
00h
Return FCI template: data stored in the file with
ID 1Fh should be returned
0Ch
No response data: no FCI should be returned
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Name
Lc
Length
[1]
Value
00h .. 10h
–
Description
Length of subsequent data field
Reference
Data
[1..16]
Empty
[if P1 == 00h OR P1 == 03h]
Select MF
Full range
Full range
Full range
[if P1 == 00h OR P1 == 01h OR P1== 02h]
Select with the given file identifier
[if P1 == 04h]
Select DF with the given DF name
Le
[1]
Empty or length of expected response
Table 88.ꢀ Response data parameters description – ISOSelectFile
Name
Length
Value
Description
SW1SW2
2
9000h
successful execution
XXXXh
Table 89.ꢀ Return code description – ISOSelectFile
SW1|SW2
ISO6700
ISO6985
ISO6A82
Value
6700h
6985h
6A82h
Description
Wrong or inconsistent APDU length.
Wrapped chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
Application or file not found, currently selected application
remains selected.
ISO6A86
ISO6A87
ISO6E00
6A86h
6A87h
6E00h
Wrong parameter P1 and/or P2
Wrong parameter Lc inconsistent with P1-P2
Wrong CLA
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11.10.2 ISOReadBinary
The ISOReadBinary is a standard ISO/IEC 7816-4 command. It can be used to read data
from the Standard Data File. This command does not support any secure messaging, it is
always in plain. For executing ISOReadBinary command either “Read” or “Read&Write”,
access right must be set to free access rights.
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
00 B0 XX
P2
XX
Le
–
Le
00
PCD to PICC
up to 256
1
1
status
Response data
–
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032227
Figure 30.ꢀISOReadBinary command protocol
Table 90.ꢀ Command parameters description – ISOReadBinary
Name
CLA
INS
Length
Value
00h
Description
1
1
B0h
P1
1
ShortFile ID/Offset
Encoding
Bit 7
1b
P1[Bit 6..5] are RFU.
P1[Bit 4..0] encode a short ISO FileID.
P2[Bit 7..0] encode an offset from zero to 255.
0b
P1 – P2 (15 bits) encode an offset from zero to
32767.
Bit 6-5
Bit 4-0
00b
[if P1[7] == 1b] RFU
[if P1[7] == 1b] short ISO FileID
Targeting currently selected file.
00h
01h .. 1Eh
Targeting and selecting file referenced by the
given short ISO FileID.
1Fh
RFU
Bit 6-0
1
(see P2)
[if P1[7] == 0b] Most significant bits of Offset
Offset (see above)
P2
Le
000000h ..
(FileSize – 1)
1
–
The number of bytes to be read from the
file. The length of a secure messaging MAC
(depending on communication mode settings)
should be included in this value.
00h
Read the entire StandardData file, starting from
the position specified in the offset value. Note
that the short length Le limits response data to
256 byte.
01h .. FFh
If bigger than (FileSize – Offset), after
subtracting MAC length if MAC is to be
returned, the entire StandardData file starting
from the offset position is returned.
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Name
Length
Value
Description
Full range
Table 91.ꢀResponse data parameters description – ISOReadBinary
Name
Length
up to 256
2
Value
Description
Data
–
Data read.
SW1SW2
9000h
successful execution
XXXXh
Table 92.ꢀ Return code description – ISOReadBinary
SW1|SW2
ISO6581
ISO6700
ISO6982
Value
6581h
6700h
6982h
Description
Memory failure
Wrong or inconsistent APDU length.
Security status not satisfied: no access allowed as Read and
ReadWrite access rights are different from Eh and SDMFileRead
(if SDM enabled) access right is set to Fh.
Security status not satisfied: SDMReadCtr overflow.
Security status not satisfied: Targeted file cannot be read in
not authenticated state as the related SDMReadCtr is equal or
bigger than its SDMReadCtrLimit.
Security status not satisfied: AuthenticatedEV2 not allowed.
Security status not satisfied: AuthenticatedLRP not allowed.
ISO6985
6985h
Wrapped chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
No file selected.
Targeted file is not of StandardData.
Application of targeted file holds a TransactionMAC file.
ISO6A82
ISO6A86
ISO6E00
6A82h
6A86h
6E00h
File not found
Wrong parameter P1 and/or P2
Wrong CLA
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11.10.3 ISOUpdateBinary
The ISOUpdateBinary command is implemented in compliance with ISO/IEC 7816-4, the
command is only possible with CommMode.Plain for a Standard Data File. NT4H2421Tx
supports tearing protection for data that is sent within one communication frame to
the file. Consequently, when using ISO/IEC 14443-4 chaining to write to a Standard
Data File, each frame itself is tearing protected but an interrupted chaining can lead to
inconsistent files. Using single-frame ISOUpdateBinary commands instead of using the
chaining can enable better control of the overall write process.
1
1
1
1
1
up to 255 bytes
Data
–
CLA CMD
P1
00 D6 XX
P2
XX
Lc
XX
PCD to PICC
PICC to PCD
1
1
status
SW1 SW2
aaa-032228
Figure 31.ꢀISOUpdateBinary command protocol
Table 93.ꢀ Command parameters description – ISOUpdateBinary
Name
CLA
INS
Length
Value
00h
Description
1
1
D6h
P1
1
ShortFile ID/Offset
RFU
Bit 7
1b
P1[Bit 6..5] are RFU.
P1[Bit 4..0] encode a short ISO FileID.
P2[Bit 7..0] encode an offset from zero to 255.
0b
P1 – P2 (15 bits) encode an offset from zero to
32767.
Bit 6-5
Bit 4-0
00b
[if P1[7] == 1b] RFU
[if P1[7] == 1b] short ISO FileID
Targeting currently selected file.
00h
01h .. 1Eh
Targeting and selecting file referenced by the
given short ISO FileID.
1Fh
RFU
Bit 6-0
1
(see P2)
[if P1[7] == 0b] Most significant bits of Offset
Offset (see above)
P2
000000h ..
(FileSize – 1)
Lc
1
01h .. (FileSize
Length of subsequent data field
– Offset)
Data
up to 255 byte
Full range
Data to be written
Table 94.ꢀ Response data parameters description – ISOUpdateBinary
Name Length
Value Description
No response data parameters defined for this command
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Name
Length
Value
Description
SW1SW2
2
9000h
successful execution
XXXXh
Table 95.ꢀ Return code description – ISOUpdateBinary
SW1|SW2
ISO6581
ISO6700
ISO6982
Value
6581h
6700h
6982h
Description
Memory failure
Wrong or inconsistent APDU length.
Security status not satisfied: only free write with Write or
ReadWrite equal to Eh is allowed.
Security status not satisfied: AuthenticatedEV2 not allowed.
Security status not satisfied: AuthenticatedLRP not allowed.
ISO6985
6985h
Wrapped chained command or multiple pass command ongoing.
No file selected.
Attempt to write beyond the file boundary as set during creation.
ISO6A82
ISO6A86
ISO6E00
6A82h
6A86h
6E00h
File not found
Wrong parameter P1 and/or P2
Wrong CLA
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11.11 Originality
check commands
The originality check allows verification of the genuineness of NTAG 424 DNA TT
(NT4H2421Tx). Two ways are offered to check the originality of the PICC: the first
is based on a symmetric authentication, the second works on the verification of an
asymmetric signature retrieved from the card.
The authentication procedure for AES keys can be used to authenticate to one of the
The asymmetric originality signature is based on ECC and only requires a public key for
the verification, which is done outside the card. The Read_Sig command can be used
in both ISO/IEC 14443-3 and ISO/IEC 14443-4 protocols to retrieve the signature. If
the PICC is not configured for Random ID, the command is freely available. There is no
authentication required. If the PICC is configured for Random ID, an authentication is
required.
11.11.1 Read_Sig
The Read_Sig retrieves the asymmetric originality signature based on an asymmetric
cryptographic algorithm Elliptic Curve Cryptography Digital Signature Algorithm
protocol. The purpose of originality check signature is to protect from mass copying of
non NXP originated ICs. The purpose of originality check signature is not to completely
prevent HW copy or emulation of individual ICs.
A public key is required for the verification, which is done outside the card. The
NXPOriginalitySignature is computed over the UID and written during manufacturing.
If the PICC is not configured for Random ID, the command is freely available. There is
no authentication required. If the PICC is configured for Random ID, an authentication
with any authentication key is required. If there is an active authentication, the command
requires encrypted secure messaging.
Remark:
The originality function is provided to prove that the IC has been manufactured
by NXP Semiconductors.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Data
00
CLA CMD
P1
90 3C 00
P2
00
Lc
01
Le
00
PCD to PICC
56
1
1
status
Response data
Signature
PICC to PCD
SW1 SW2
aaa-032229
Figure 32.ꢀRead_Sig command protocol
Table 96.ꢀ Command parameters description – Read_Sig
Name
Command Header Parameters
CMD
Command Data Parameters
Length
Value
Description
1
3Ch
Command code
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Name
Length
Value
Description
Command Header Parameters
Data
1
–
Targeted ECC originality check signature
Targeting NXPOriginalitySignature
RFU
00h
01h .. FFh
Table 97.ꢀ Response data parameters description – Read_Sig
Name
Length
Value
Description
Data
56
2
Full range
NXPOriginalitySignature
SW1SW2
9100h
91XXh
successful execution
Table 98.ꢀ Return code description – Read_Sig
Status
Value Description
COMMAND_NOT_FOUND
0Bh
Not allowed without valid authentication due to
Random ID configuration.
Missing or incorrect MAC when authenticated.
COMMAND_ABORTED
CAh
Previous Command was not fully completed. Not all
Frames were requested or provided by the PCD.
COMMAND_FORMAT_ERROR 0Ch
Unexpected command length.
Unsupported Address
The NXPOriginalitySignature is computed over the UID with the use of asymmetric
cryptographic algorithm Elliptic Curve Cryptography Digital Signature Algorithm
Signature calculation uses curve secp224r1. NXP Originality signature verification
together with example is explained in NT4H2421Tx – Feature and Hints application note.
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12 Limiting
values
Stresses exceeding one or more of the limiting values, can cause permanent damage to
the device. Exposure to limiting values for extended periods can affect device reliability.
Table 99.ꢀLimiting values
In accordance with the Absolute Maximum Rating System (IEC 60134).
Symbol Parameter
Conditions
Min
Max
40
Unit
mA
mW
°C
I
I
input current
on LA/LB
–
P
tot
T
stg
T
amb
V
ESD
total power dissipation
storage temperature
ambient temperature
–
120
125
70
-55
-25
–
°C
electrostatic discharge voltage
on LA/LB
2
kV
[1] ANSI/ESDA/JEDEC
JS-001; Human body model: C = 100 pF, R = 1.5 kΩ
CAUTION
This device is sensitive to ElectroStatic Discharge (ESD). Observe
precautions for handling electrostatic sensitive devices.
Such precautions are described in the
ANSI/ESD S20.20, IEC/ST 61340-5,
JESD625-A
or equivalent standards.
13 Characteristics
Table 100.ꢀCharacteristics
Symbol Parameter
Conditions
Min
45.0
–
Typ
50.0
13.56
–
Max
55.0
–
Unit
pF
C
i
input capacitance
f
i
input frequency
MHz
Ω
R
on
R
off
resistance tag taper closed
resistance tag tamper open
DP – GND
DP – GND
–
50
–
1 M
–
Ω
EEPROM characteristics
t
ret
retention time
T
amb
= 22 °C
T
amb
= 22 °C
20
–
–
–
–
year
N
endu(W)
write endurance
200.000
cycle
[1] T
amb
= 22 °C, f = 13.56 MHz, V
LaLb
= 2 V RMS
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
14 Abbreviations
Table 101.ꢀAbbreviations
Acronym
Description
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
Application Identifier
AID
APDU
AppKey
AppMasterKey
ASCII
ATQA
ATS
Application Protocol Data Unit
Application Key
Application Master Key
American Standard Code for Information Interchange
Answer to Request A
Answer to Select
C-APDU
CBC
CC
Command APDU
Cipher Block Chain, one mode of operation for block ciphers
Capability Container
CID
Channel Identifier
CLA
Class
CMAC
CmdCtr
DF
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
Command Counter
Dedicated File (Application)
Detection Pin
DP
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elementary File (File)
ECC
EF
FCI
File Control Information
Film Frame Carrier
FFC
FID
File Identifier
FSC
Frame Size for proximity Card
Frame Waiting Time Integer
Instructions
FWI
INS
IV
Initialization Vector
LRP
Leakage Resilient Primitive
Least Significant Byte
LSB
MAC
MF
Message Authentication Code
Master File (PICC Level)
Most Significant Byte
MSB
NDEF
NFC
NFC Data Exchange Format
Near Field Communication
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Acronym
Description
NVM
PCD
Non-Volatile Memory
Proximity Coupling Device (Contactless Reader)
Proximity Coupling Device Capabilities
Proximity Device, used as synonym for the PICC
Proximity Device Capabilities
Proximity IC Card
PCDCap
PD
PDCap
PICC
PICCData
PPS
PICC data targeted for mirroring (e.g. UID, SDMReadCtr)
Protocol Parameter Select
RC
Return Code
R-APDU
RFU
Response APDU
Reserved for future use
RID
Random ID
SAK
Select Acknowledge
SAM
Secure Access Module
SDM
Secure Dynamic Messaging
SDM Counter Retrieval, access right for GetFileCounters
Refers to the encrypted part of data in the NDEF file
SDMCtrRet
SDMENCFileData
SDMFileRead
SDM File Reading, key/access setting for Secure Dynamic
Messaging
SDMFileReadKey
SDMMAC
Refers to the AppKey which is used for SDM MAC calculation
Refers to the MAC calculated over response
SDMMetaRead
SDM Meta Reading, specifies PICCData encryption key or plain
mirroring
SDMMetaReadKey
SDMReadCtr
SesAuthENCKey
SesAuthMACKey
SesTMENCKey
SesTMMACKey
SM
Refers to the AppKey which is used for SDM encryption of PICCData
SDM Read Counter, counting number of interactions with a PICC
Session key for encryption
Session key for MACing
Transaction MAC Session Key for Encryption
Transaction MAC Session Key for MACing
Secure Messaging
SUN
Secure Unique NFC
SV
Session Vector, input for session key calculation
Status Word
SW
TI
Transaction Identifier
TotFailCtr
TotFailCtrDecr
TotFailCtrLimit
TT
Total Failed Authentication Counter
Total Failed Authentication Counter Decrement
Total Failed Authentication Counter Limit
Tag Tamper
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NTAG 424 DNA TT – Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with Tag Tamper feature
Acronym
TTCurrStatus
Description
Current status of the Tag Tamper loop
Permanently stores an Open status on the Tag Tamper loop
TTPermStatus
TTStatusKey
Refers to an AppKey, authentication with this key is required to issue
UID
Unique IDentifier
15 References
[1]
ISO/IEC 14443-2:2016
Identification cards — Contactless integrated circuit cards — Proximity cards — Part
2: Radio frequency power and signal interface
[2]
ISO/IEC 14443-3:2016
Identification cards — Contactless integrated circuit cards — Proximity cards — Part
3: Initialization and anti-collision
[3]
ISO/IEC 14443-4:2016
Identification cards — Contactless integrated circuit cards — Proximity cards — Part
4: Transmission protocol
[4]
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005
Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 4: Organization, security and
commands for interchange
[5]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Recommendation for
BlockCipher Modes of Operation.
[6]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication.
[7]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999
Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher.
[8]
NIST Special Publication 800-108
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Recommendation for key
derivation using pseudorandom functions.
[9]
IEEE Std 802.3-2008
IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific
requirements Part 3: Carrier sense multiple access with Collision Detection (CSMA/
CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications.
[10]
LRP
Leakage Resilient Primitive (LRP) Specification, Document number 4660**
1
[11]
Data sheet addendum
NT4H2421Tx – Wafer specification, Document number 4658**
[1]
[12]
Certicom Research. Sec 1
Elliptic curve cryptography. Version 2.0, May 2009.
1
** … document version number
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[13]
Product Data Sheet
NXP Semiconductors, NTAG213/215/216: NFC Forum Type 2 Tag compliant IC
with 144/504/888 bytes user memory, Document number 2653**
[1]
[14]
NFC Forum: Type 4 Tag – Technical Specification
NFC Forum: Type 4 Tag – Technical Specification – Version 1.0 – [T4T] –
2016.07.26, 07 2016.
[15]
NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF)
NFC Forum – Technical Specification – Version 1.0 – 24.07.2006
16 Revision
history
Table 102.ꢀRevision history NT4H2421Tx
Document ID
Release
date
Data sheet status
Change notice
Supersedes
465530
20190131 Product
data sheet
–
465511
Modifications:
•
Data sheet status changed into Product data sheet
•
Security status changed into “Company public”
465511
20181105 Objective
data sheet
465510
Modifications:
•
added
response codes
in
Status word
465510
20180321 Objective
data sheet
–
–
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17 Legal
information
17.1 Data
sheet status
Definition
Objective [short] data sheet
Development
This document contains data from the objective specification for product
development.
Preliminary [short] data sheet
Product [short] data sheet
Qualification
Production
This document contains data from the preliminary specification.
This document contains the product specification.
[1] Please
consult the most recently issued document before initiating or completing a design.
[2] The
term ‘short data sheet’ is explained in section “Definitions”.
[3] The
product status of device(s) described in this document may have changed since this document was published and may differ in case of multiple
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
17.2 Definitions
Suitability for use
— NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in life support, life-critical or
safety-critical systems or equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of an NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors and its suppliers accept no liability for
inclusion and/or use of NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or
applications and therefore such inclusion and/or use is at the customer’s own
risk.
Draft
— The document is a draft version only. The content is still under
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences
of use of such information.
Short data sheet
— A short data sheet is an extract from a full data sheet
with the same product type number(s) and title. A short data sheet is
intended for quick reference only and should not be relied upon to contain
detailed and full information. For detailed and full information see the
relevant full data sheet, which is available on request via the local NXP
Semiconductors sales office. In case of any inconsistency or conflict with the
short data sheet, the full data sheet shall prevail.
Applications
— Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes
no representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable
for the specified use without further testing or modification. Customers
are responsible for the design and operation of their applications and
products using NXP Semiconductors products, and NXP Semiconductors
accepts no liability for any assistance with applications or customer product
design. It is customer’s sole responsibility to determine whether the NXP
Semiconductors product is suitable and fit for the customer’s applications
and products planned, as well as for the planned application and use of
customer’s third party customer(s). Customers should provide appropriate
design and operating safeguards to minimize the risks associated with
their applications and products. NXP Semiconductors does not accept any
liability related to any default, damage, costs or problem which is based
on any weakness or default in the customer’s applications or products, or
the application or use by customer’s third party customer(s). Customer is
responsible for doing all necessary testing for the customer’s applications
and products using NXP Semiconductors products in order to avoid a
default of the applications and the products or of the application or use by
customer’s third party customer(s). NXP does not accept any liability in this
respect.
Product specification
— The information and data provided in a Product
data sheet shall define the specification of the product as agreed between
NXP Semiconductors and its customer, unless NXP Semiconductors and
customer have explicitly agreed otherwise in writing. In no event however,
shall an agreement be valid in which the NXP Semiconductors product
is deemed to offer functions and qualities beyond those described in the
Product data sheet.
17.3 Disclaimers
Limited warranty and liability
— Information in this document is believed
to be accurate and reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not
give any representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the
accuracy or completeness of such information and shall have no liability
for the consequences of use of such information. NXP Semiconductors
takes no responsibility for the content in this document if provided by an
information source outside of NXP Semiconductors. In no event shall NXP
Semiconductors be liable for any indirect, incidental, punitive, special or
consequential damages (including – without limitation – lost profits, lost
savings, business interruption, costs related to the removal or replacement
of any products or rework charges) whether or not such damages are based
on tort (including negligence), warranty, breach of contract or any other
legal theory. Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for
any reason whatsoever, NXP Semiconductors’ aggregate and cumulative
liability towards customer for the products described herein shall be limited
in accordance with the Terms and conditions of commercial sale of NXP
Semiconductors.
Limiting values
— Stress above one or more limiting values (as defined in
the Absolute Maximum Ratings System of IEC 60134) will cause permanent
damage to the device. Limiting values are stress ratings only and (proper)
operation of the device at these or any other conditions above those
given in the Recommended operating conditions section (if present) or the
Characteristics sections of this document is not warranted. Constant or
repeated exposure to limiting values will permanently and irreversibly affect
the quality and reliability of the device.
Terms and conditions of commercial sale
— NXP Semiconductors
products are sold subject to the general terms and conditions of commercial
agreed in a valid written individual agreement. In case an individual
agreement is concluded only the terms and conditions of the respective
agreement shall apply. NXP Semiconductors hereby expressly objects to
applying the customer’s general terms and conditions with regard to the
purchase of NXP Semiconductors products by customer.
Right to make changes
— NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to
make changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
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No offer to sell or license
— Nothing in this document may be interpreted
or construed as an offer to sell products that is open for acceptance or
the grant, conveyance or implication of any license under any copyrights,
patents or other industrial or intellectual property rights.
Translations
— A non-English (translated) version of a document is for
reference only. The English version shall prevail in case of any discrepancy
between the translated and English versions.
Quick reference data
— The Quick reference data is an extract of the
product data given in the Limiting values and Characteristics sections of this
document, and as such is not complete, exhaustive or legally binding.
17.4 Licenses
ICs with DPA Countermeasures functionality
Export control
— This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from competent authorities.
NXP ICs containing functionality
implementing countermeasures to
Differential Power Analysis and Simple
Power Analysis are produced and sold
under applicable license from Cryptography
Research, Inc.
Non-automotive qualified products
— Unless this data sheet expressly
states that this specific NXP Semiconductors product is automotive qualified,
the product is not suitable for automotive use. It is neither qualified nor
tested in accordance with automotive testing or application requirements.
NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for inclusion and/or use of non-
automotive qualified products in automotive equipment or applications. In
the event that customer uses the product for design-in and use in automotive
applications to automotive specifications and standards, customer (a) shall
use the product without NXP Semiconductors’ warranty of the product for
such automotive applications, use and specifications, and (b) whenever
customer uses the product for automotive applications beyond NXP
Semiconductors’ specifications such use shall be solely at customer’s own
risk, and (c) customer fully indemnifies NXP Semiconductors for any liability,
damages or failed product claims resulting from customer design and use
of the product for automotive applications beyond NXP Semiconductors’
standard warranty and NXP Semiconductors’ product specifications.
17.5 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and
trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
MIFARE
— is a trademark of NXP B.V.
DESFire
— is a trademark of NXP B.V.
NTAG
— is a trademark of NXP B.V.
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Tables
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Figures
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Contents
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Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in section ‘Legal information’.
© NXP B.V. 2019.
All rights reserved.
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 31 January 2019
Document identifier: 465530
Document number: 465530
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